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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WANDA SANDBERG; WANDA SANDBERG 
Administratrix of the ESTATE of 
WAYNE SANDBERG, Deceased; JEFFREY 
SCOTT SANDBERG; SUSAN SANDBERG, 
by WANDA SANDBERG, her Guardian, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
ROBERT D. KLEIN, AVALON KLEIN, ) 
JANE DOE and all other persons ) 
unknown claiming any right, title ) 
or interest in the real property ) 
described in Plaintiff's Complaint) 
adverse to Plaintiffs' Ownership ) 
or any cloud upon Plaintiffs' ) 
title thereto, ) 
& 
Defendants and 
Respondents, 
In the Matter of the ESTATE 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
of 
WAYNE SANDBERG, 
Deceased. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15146 
Plaintiffs-appellants filed this action to quiet title 
to approximately 400 acres of real property situate in Washing-
Lon County, Utah. Defendants-respondents filed a counterclaim 
seeking specific performance of an Option Agreement allegedly 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pertaining to some of the property. For purposes of judicial 
convenience, the lower court subsequently consolidated the 
quiet title action with a probate proceeding involving the 
same parties and issues. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was heard by the lower court on Motions 
for Summary Judgment either to declare the Option Agreement of , 
no effect, or to find the same specifically enforceable. On 
March 25, 1977, the court entered the ORDER from which this 
appeal is taken granting judgment in favor of Defendants on 
their Counterclaim and decreeing specific performance of a 
real estate purchase contract allegedly in conformity to the 
Option Agreement presented by ~ef~ndants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the summary judgment 
entered against them on the grounds that the Option Agreement 
is not a document susceptible of specific enforcement and that 
the Option Agreement was not properly exercised. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In early 1962, the respondent, Mr. Robert Klein, a 
man previously licensed in real estate, with a contractor's 
license and over ten years' experience in the building and 
subdividing business, came to the Sandberg home in Washine;-
ton County, Utah, with Orval Hafen, an attorney. 1 (Depo-
sition of Robert D. Klein, pp. 2-3, 17-18 [hereinafter DRK], 
1Notations to the record herein are to the civil case and 
not the probate files consolidated therewith unless 
otherwise specified. 
-2-
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R. 397) (Deposition of Wanda S. Kurt, p. 6:12-15 [hereinafter 
DWS]; R. 398) As a result of initial negotiations, on April 4, 
1962, Wayne Sandberg, now deceased, and his wife, Wanda Sand-
berg<, now Wanda Sandberg Kurt, entered into an Earnest Money 
Receipt, which was essentially a preliminary offer to Robert D. 
Klein to allow him to purchase certain real property located 
in Washington County, Utah, (DWS, pp. 6, 7:20-24, 55:23, 
R. 398; DRK 4:5, R. 397), described therein as follows: 
All land owned by the sellers in Sections 21, 
22, and 27, Township 42 South, Range 15 West, 
S.L.M., consisting, so far as the parties can 
determine at this time of approximately 500 acres 
not including any water or water rights, and less 
the following: 
There is now a reservoir constructed by the City 
of St. George on what the parties believe to be the 
NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22, and there is an old 
fence running north and south west of this reser-
voir. The sellers intend to reserve from said 
sale all land in said Section 22 which lies east 
of said fenceline, it being understood that the 
exact line will have to be determined if and 
when the option hereinafter mentioned is executed. 
(R. 196) 
The Earnest Money Receipt provided that the buyer had thirty 
days "to enter into an option" on the terms as set forth therein 
"and on such other terms as the parties hereto may agree." 
(R. 197) Moreover, the Earnest Money Receipt was specific-
ally referred to as a "preliminary contract" that of necessity 
"[did] not contain all the terms and conditions either of the 
option or the agreement to purchase, and that both of said 
documents [would] contain the usual and customary provisions." 
(R. 198) 
-3-
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The April 4, 1962, Earnest Money Receipt that 
was supposed to remain open for thirty days was extended to 
June 14, 1962, pursuant to a written addition to the docu-
ment dated April 30, 1962. On June 14, 1962, Robert Klein 
paid $500.00 on the Earnest Money Receipt to further extend 
the original thirty-day period. Additional sums totalling 
$3,500.00 were subsequently paid to prevent the option 
granted by the Earnest Money Receipt from terminating until 
December 14, 1964. (Answers to Request for Admissions of 
Robert D. Klein [hereinafter AnRK] No. 1, R. 66; Answers to 
Requests for Admissions of Wanda Sandberg [hereinafter AnWS] 
Nos. 2 & 3, R. 132) 
On September 21, 1964, however, Robert Klein and 
Wanda Sandberg, individually and as the legal representative 
and heir-at-law of Wayne Sandberg, signed an Option Agreement 
which agreement was drawn and prepared by Robert Klein. 
(AnRK No. 14, R. 69) At that time, as before, Mrs. Sandberg 
was not represented by counsel. 
By its terms, the Option Agreement formally rati-
fied the terms and conditions of the earlier Earnest Money 
Receipt "together with the modifications to which the parties 
have agreed." (R. 59) The Option Agreement covered 
[A]ll land owned by the Sellers in Section 21, 
Section 22, and Section 27 of Township 42 
South, Range 15 West, Salt Lake Base and Meri-
dian, consisting of approximately 500 acres, 
which property shall be more particularly de-
scribed in Schedule A attached hereto, to be 
signed by the parties and made a part hereof 
for all purposes; not includin; any water or 
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water rights, and excluding all land in the 
Northeast one quarter of the Northeast one 
quarter of Section 22, which lies East of the 
old fence line, which runs North and Southwest 
of the City of St. George Reservoir, said ex-
cluded property also to be more particularly 
described in Schedule A attached hereto and 
made a part hereof for all purposes. (R. 59-60) 
The "Schedule A" snoken of never came into existence and thus 
was not incorporated into the Option Agreement as recited 
therein; similarly, the description of the "excluded property" 
is also nonexistent and not attached thereto. 
Paragraph 3 of the Option Agreement recited those 
payments necessary to keep the Option Agreement in effect 
(R. 60-61) , while paragraph 4 contained provisions allowing for 
the possible extension of the Option Agreement until 1982, 
some eighteen years after the document was signed with no ad-
justment in the price for the land. (R. 61) It is not dis-
puted, however, that the last payment tendered to maintain 
and keep the option in good st~nding was made on or before 
December 14, 1970. That payment was for a six-month exten-
sion of the option until ~une 14, 1971, and, as of that date, 
the option expired. Thus, by the terms of the Option Agree-
ment the option would have had to have been exercised on or 
before June 14, 1971, to create a binding contract. (AnRK 
Nos. 1, 4, 7, 9 & 13 R. 66-69; DWS 55:13-17, R. 398) As of the last 
payment on December 14, 1970, respondent Klein had paid 
~~7.G00.0J to maintain the option in good standing. 
~aragraph 5 of the Option Agreement provided the 
only method by which the option was to be exercised: 
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5. The Buyer may exercise his right to purchase 
this property for the sum of Two Hundred Dollars 
($200.00) per acre at any time during the option 
period, (including any extension period) by exec-
uting a contract to Durchase all or such part or 
parts of the property as the parties may agree; 
such contract shall provide as follows: (R. 61 
(emphasis added)) 
Thereafter, several subparagraphs of paragraph 5 set forth 
some of the terms and conditions to be provided in the con-
tract. For example, subparagraph Sb required a down payment 
under the contract of "Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) (or 
such other amount as the parties may agree) on said contract", 
and paragraph Se provided for partial releases of contiguous 
land selected by the buyer or otherwise as mutually agreed 
by both parties. (R. 62) 
On March 12, 1971, while state appraisers were ap-
praising the Sandberg property at $100. 00 per acre for probate 
purposes, Mrs. Sandberg, at Robert Klein's request, authorized 
James R. Brown, a Utah attorney, to represent her in a condem-
nation proceeding filed against her by Dixie Rural Electric 
Association. (DWS 27:9-18, R. 398, R. lOS) In that same 
authorization she assigned whatever proceeds were received 
from those proceedings to Robert Klein, subject, of course, 
to his proper exercise of the option. (R. lOS; AnWS No. 10, 
R. 13S) 
On March 30, 1971, respondent Klein apparently 
delivered to Wanda Sandberg a letter indicating "his inten-
tion of exercising the option of September 24, 1964." 
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Petition for Order Requi~ing Administratrix To Execute 
Deeds, and for Specific Performance of Contract, 1[14, Pro-
bate Record 57;R.71) Respondent Klein has stated and the lower 
court has ruled that the letter of March 30, 1971, together 
with some verbal communication was the understanding of the 
parties regarding the contract for purchase (AnRK. No. 11, 
R. 68; Order of District Court [hereinafter Order] V7, R. 358), 
and that Mrs. Sandberg knew that respondent "was purchasing 
all of the property in my [his] letter." (DRK. 13: 13-16; 
R. 397) That letter, unsigned in the record before the Court, 
in pertinent part, states as follows: 
[T]here are one or two matters that should be con-
sidered preparatory to my exercising the option and 
the delivery of title to a portion of the land 
designated by the option. -
My interpretation of the number of acres involved 
essentially corresponds with yours, namely that the 
land Wayne intended to sell lies west of the fence 
line that you and I have both seen together. I 
would like you to know that I can appreciate your 
concern that thia line be agreed to by both of us. 
If you think about it, descriptions along sec-
tion or quarter section lines generally are more 
easily handled. It is for this reason, after 
careful review that I have discribed [sic] the 
annexation description as indicated by the plat 
which I am including with this letter. This de-
scription, within a few feet, corresponds with 
the fence line that you and I have observed to-
gether when we last saw each other. [sic] This 
I trust will correspond with your own interpreta-
tion sf what land you in fact believe you are 
~rLling. Should you still have some apprehension 
that I am not aware of, I am sure that on a face 
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to face basis and with the help of a surveyor 
we can resolve fairly t:o each of ou:::- satisfaction 
whatever diffenences [sic] of opinion we may 
encounter. 
I trust that the linen of the kind which I am 
showing you at the tirne of delivery of this 
letter will be all that will be required. You 
will note that I am only proposing that land 
be annexed which I am in fact buying from you. 
(R. 71- 73) 
The proposed annexation linen spoken of in the let-
ter was executed by Robert Klein and Wanda Sandberg on April 
5, 1971. (Affidavit of Robert D. Klein [hereinafter ARK] H4, 
R. 39) That same linen bearing the subsequent approval of the 
St. George City Council appears in the record on page 109 and 
in the probate record at page 83. (Note there are two set of 
BO's in the probate record) According to respondent Klein, 
this plat dealt with the real property which was the subject 
matter of this lawsuit. (ARK H4; R. 339) Specifically, 
respondent Klein has stated, apparently to confirm the letter 
of March 30th' s language, that "he was buying approximately 
450 acres described in the Holidaire Lands annexation plat and 
the option agreement dated September 21, 1964," which lands 
respondent Klein caused to be annexed to the City of St. Gear~ 
on May 17, 1971. (Answers to Request for Admissions, First Set 
and Interrogatories, Fourth Set of Robert D. Klein [hereinafter 
An1I4RK] 2c, R. 151; ARK H4, R. 339-40; Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities of Robert D. Klein [hereinafter ~1RK], R. 289) 
On June 3, 1971, respondent Klein drafted a check 
bearing the notation "down payment to commence June 15 agree-
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ment 1971." (R. 64) This check was tendered to Mrs. Sand-
berg on June 7, 1971, as the down payment on the contract 
contemplated by paragraph 5 of the September 21, 1964, 
Option Agreement and not as payment under paragraph 3d of 
the Option Agreement to keep it in good standing. (AnRK Nos. 
2-5, R. 67; R. 61) Respondent Klein sucessfully asserted 
before the lower court that this act, coupled with the de-
livery of the prior letter of March 30, 1971, exercised the 
option. (MRK lf8, R. 271; Order 117, R. 358) 
Though respondent Klein had requested a release 
of 55 acres in his letter of March 30, 1971, (R. 71-73), Mrs. 
Sandberg conveyed only 40 acres to repondent Klein, executing 
a Warranty Deed prepared by him. (AnRK No. 7, R. 68; R. 111) 
The conveyance, in particularity, dealt with the 
SE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 21, Township 42 South, 
Range 15 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian 
(R. 111) 
All Mrs. Sandberg recalls was that respondent Klein wanted 
this property because he already had it sold. (DWS 26:13-20, 
R. 398) Respondent Klein did sell that property, apparently 
all 40 acres, to one Harman Johnson for $700.00 per acre. 
(DRK 11:20-28, R. 397) 
Although the check dated June 3, 1971, bore the in-
scription "down payment on June 15, agreement 1971", at no 
time prior to June 15, 1971, did the respondent execute a 
contract to purchase "all or such part or parts of the prop-
erty as the parties may agree" as required by paragraph 5 
of the Option Agreement. (R. 64; AnRK No. 10, R. 68; R. 61) 
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In fact, there is no agreement of June 15, 1971, in the 
record because no such agreement exists. It is important 
to note that respondent Klein stipulated that ''at no time 
duri?g her contacts with Defendant [respondent) in this 
case did she [Wanda Sandberg] request the Defendant [respon-
dent) to abstain from submitting contracts required pursuant 
to the 1964 option agreement' entered into by the parties. 
(R. 355; Transcript [hereinafter T) 7:12-14, R. 399) 
As no payments were made to extend the option after 
December 14, 1970, the period for exercising the option term-
inated on June 14, 1971. (Option Agreement t3, R. 60-61; 
R. 339; AnRK No. 1, R. 66-67) 
In April of 1972, some ten months later, respondent 
Klein met with Mrs. Sandberg purportedly to finalize arrange-
ments with her to complete a survey to determine the exact 
acreage of the Holidaire Lands Addition to St. George so 
that the real estate contract contemplated by paragraph 5 
of the Option Agreement could be drafted and the annual 
installment required under that proposed document computed. 
(MRK pt. 10, R. 272) Mrs. Sandberg, however, concluded that 
after her conveyance of forty acres, and, in the absence of 
the June 14, 1971, and December 14, 1971, payments under 
paragraph 3d of the Option Agreement, that the Option Agree-
ment had terminated. (DWS 28-29, 33:26-30, R. 398) Respondent 
Klein, nonetheless, apparently requested and paid Howard G 
Stevens, a registered land surveyor, for a survey in the 
entire NE 1/4 of Section 22, T42S, Rl5W, of a fenceline 
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which respondent Klein had shown to Mr. Stevens which Klein 
apparently believed to be the fenceline referred to in the 
Option Agreement and Earnest Money Receipt. (Affidavit of 
Howard G. Stevens, [hereinafter AHS] 117, R. 264) Meanwhile 
on May 2, 1972, respondent Klein's attorney, Leo A. Jardine, 
Esq., wrote Royal K. Hunt, Esq., who had been retained by 
Mrs. Sandberg adjunct to the probate proceedings, a letter. 
The pertinent part of that letter pertaining to land descrip-
tions reads as follows: 
The parties have also tentatively agreed as to 
the property description which, in our opinion, 
is the only matter yet to be fully resolved 
but can be resolved and determined by applica-
tion of the provisions of the contract and the 
written notations made by the parties on that 
plat or from a physical survey of the property. 
(R. llS) 
The "contract" spoken above was the Option Agreement, because 
on May 2, 1972, there was still 90 contract as contemplated 
by paragraph 5 of the Option Agreement in existence. 
Howard Stevens completed the survey requested by 
respondent Klein on May 12, 1972. (AHS ~8, R. 264) On May 
16, 1972, respondent Klein executed as grantee and submitted 
to Wanda Sandberg for her signature as granter a Real Estate 
Purchase Contract which was alleged to be "in every way con-
sistent with the terms and conditions of the Option Agree-
ment." (MRK pt. 10, R. 272) The lower court also took this 
position, that is, that "[t]he real estate Agreement, submit-
ted by Robert D. Klein to Wanda Sandberg, was in conformity 
both as to description and consideration with the option 
agreement." (Order ,4, R. 358) 
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The real estate purchase contract submitted to 
Mrs. Sandberg by respondent Klein appears in the record on 
pages 117-121. Although the Option Agreement only reserved 
to the sellers [Sandberg] some land contained in the 
"Northeast one quarter of the Northeast one quarter of sec-
tion 22" (R. 60), the real estate purchase contract reserved 
for the sellers land not only in the NE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 
of Section 22, but in the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 as well. This 
additional reservation to Mrs. Sandberg was the result of 
Mr. Stevens' survey of a fence line shown to him by respon-
dent Klein. Thus, respondent Klein's "conforming contract", 
in seeking to convey only part of Section 22, in the follow-
ing language, left Mrs. Sandberg with more land than had 
been reserved for her by the Option Agreement, and was an 
attempted exercise for only part of the property subject to 
the option. 
Beginning in an existing fenceline at its 
intersection with the north line of Section 
22, Tl+2S, Rl5W, SLB&M which point is 12. 2 
feet west from a stone mound marking the NE 
corner NE 1/4 NE 1/4 said Section 22 and 
running thence S 0° 14' W 1338.5 feet along 
said fence line, thence S. 89 ° 36' 30" E 41+3. 0 
feet along said fence, thence S 10° 09' 30" 
W 405.0 feet along said fence, thence S 12° 
40' 10" W 910.49 feet, more or 12ss, along 
said fence to the South line NE 1/4 said Sec-
tion 22, thence west 1380 feet to the SW cor-
ner said NE 1/4, thence north 2640 feet to the 
N 1/4 corner said Section 22, thence east 
1307.8 feet to the point of beginning. Con-
taining 86.84 acres, more or less. (R. 121) 
Simply stated, there is land in the SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 not 
~equested from Mrs. Sandberg by respondent Klein, and, there-
fore, specifically reserved for her by respondent Klein's 
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Real Estate Purchase Contract. This fact is not affected by 
Mrs. Sandberg's conveyance of 40 acres in June of 1971, as 
that land was entirely in Section 21. (AnRK No. 7, R. 68; 
R. 111; R. 119) 
Of course, respondent Klein can state that just 
such an exercise was authorized by paragraph 5 of the Option 
Agreement which in setting forth the manner of the Option 
Agreement's exercise called for a contract "to purchase all 
or such part or parts of the property as the parties may 
agree." (R. 60) Nonetheless, while the parties theoretically 
might have agreed to any description of land, Klein himself 
has not been consistent. For example, it is difficult to 
reconcile the fact that the real estate purchase contract 
covers approximately 70 acres less than the Holidaire Lands 
Addition to the City of St. George, all of which respondent 
Klein indicated he intended to .buy in his letter of March 30, 
1971. (R. 73; ARK U4, R. 339; An1I4RK 2c, R. 151; MRK, 
R. 289) Stranger still is the lower court's holding that 
this letter, unsigned in the record before the Court, along 
with the June 7, 1971 payment of $2,000.00 exercised the 
Option Agreement giving rise to the real estate purchase 
contract, which covers less than all of that annexation. 
(Order ,~ 4 and 5, R. 358) 
A check dated June 1, 1972, for the sum of $8,627.84 
with the notation "1972 annual principal and interest, and 
contract payment" was ultimately tendered to Mrs. Sandberg 
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presumably pursuant to the aforementioned unilaterallv 
drafted real estate purchase contract. (R. 122) 
Receiving no response, respondent Klein on June 13, 1972, 
caused F. Clayton Nelson, Esq., to hand deliver to Mrs. 
Sandberg a cashier's check in the amount of $68,359.04. 
(R. between 122 and 123, unnumbered; DRK 6-8, R. 397) Along 
with that check was another unsigned letter which stated, 
inter alia: 
Please find enclosed herewith a cashier's 
check in the amount of $68,359.04 which con-
stitutes payment in full for the 431.84 
acres (40 acres of which you have delivered) 
which l have purchased from you and Wayne 
under our original Ear~est Money Agreement 
dated April 4, 1962 ... (R. 124 (emphasis 
added)) 
Respondent Klein probably failed to notify Attorney Nelson 
that Mrs. Sandberg was already represented by an attorney. 
(DRK 8, R. 397) 
On July 6, 1972, respondent Klein, as president of 
Capital Enterprises, Inc., sent a letter demandin~ that Mrs. 
Sandberg deliver deeds to some property described as "Exhib-
it A" in said letter, but not part of the record. 2 (R. 125) 
Five days later, on July 11, 1972, Mrs. Sandberg's attorney, 
Royal K. Hunt, Esq., returned the tender of $68,359.04 along 
with a letter indicating that the option had terminatec prior 
to the tender of the June 1972 real estate purchase contract. 
(R. 126) 
2 
Presumably the "Exhibit A" spoken of would be the same 
"Exhibit A" as is attached to the ~eal estate purchase con-
signed by respondent Klein on :'1ay 16, 1972. (R. 121) 
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On AprU 3, 197L1, Mrs. Sandberg f:i,led an action to 
quiet title to the real property ultim~tely claimed by respon-
dent Klein as set forth in "Exhibit A" to his real estate 
purc~ase contract. (R. 1-3, 121) Therafter, acting on the 
advice of her attorney and for tax purposes, Mrs. Sandberg 
quit-claimed whatever interest she had in all of the lands 
mentioned in the original Earnest Money Receipt to a limited 
partnership in which her children are the limited partners. 
(DWS 48-49, R. 398) Subsequently, all parties named as de-
fendants to the quiet title action have admitted that what-
ever right or title they have to those lands described in 
"Exhibit A" to respondent Klein's real estate purchase contract 
is claimed by and through respondent Klein. 
On the 17th day of January, 1977, the Honorable J. 
Harlan Burns, District Judge, set the case for trial. Some 
two weeks later, on February 7, 1977, respondent Klein 
filed a counterclaim dated February 4th stating that "the 
property described as "Exhibit A" in the real estate purchase 
contract was that certain real property referred to in both 
the Earnest Money Receipt and Option Agreement. (R. 121, 
170; Counterclaim of Robert D. Klein [hereinafter CRK] VVl, 
3, 4 and 6, R. 166-168) 
Concurrently with the filing of respondent's 
counterclaim, Mrs. Sandberg filed a Motion for Summary Judg-
ment. Subsequently, a similar motion was filed by respondent 
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Klein. Upon counsel's stipulation as to the facts, 3 the 
motions were heard on March 15, 1977, by Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, District Judge, sitting in Washington County due to 
the illness of Judge Burns. 
3A stipulation as to the facts of this case was entered 
at the hearing on the motions for sunnnary judgment. From 
the record, however, it is unclear what the parties stipu-
lated. Appellants believe the stipulation was as to the 
existence of certain documents, the contents, dates, and signa-
tures thereto if existent and as to the date and fact of 
receipt and delivery of the various docu.~ents. 
The stipulation was made at the insistence 
of the court . 
. . . are you prepared to stipulate that this case 
may be submitted to the Court as a question of 
law based upon your statement of facts as set 
forth in your Motion for Summary Judgment? 
(T 6:12-15.) 
As stated in the above excerpt, the court apparently 
felt that the salient facts were set out in the memoranda in 
support of the various motions. 
If you are willing to stipulate that it is a 
question of law based upon the fact as set 
forth in your respective motions. ( T 6: 26-29.) 
The rejective counsel, however, felt that the 
motion was submitted on the basis of all the materials in 
the file. 
MR COWLEY: Your Honor, I don't believe there 
is any dispute as to the facts, and I've trav-
eled down here to argue the motion, and we are 
willing to submit it on the basis of the mater-
ials in the file. (T 6:20-24.) 
MR COWLEY: Your Honor, I think maybe we om;ht 
to clear up by the record one more bit on this, 
and that is that it is subIT.itted on the evidence 
before the Court in the file at this time and 
that this hearing is going to be an argument on 
the law and not the introduction of any further 
testimony or evidence. 
THE COURT: That is my impression. 
MR. THOMPSON: That is my impression. 
(T 6:28-8:5) 
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ARGUMENT 
PART_9N~ - PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS 
POINT I 
(Procedural) 
THE SCOPE OF JUDIC~AL REVIEW ENCOMPASSES 
BOTH LEGAL AND FACTUAL ISSUES 
In equitable actions appellate review traditionally 
encompasses both the law and the facts. This broad scope of 
review is warranted because the original trial involved no 
finder of fact other than a judge, so the appellate court may 
easily place itself in the position of the trier of fact, 
which is not possible in review of jury trials. Some juris-
dictions have even adopted a trial de novo review of equity 
cases in their supreme courts. See, e.g., Smith v. Vehrs, 
242 P.2d 586(0re. 1952). 
Utah, while not providing for a trial de novo pro-
cedure in equitable proceedings', does provide for appellate 
review of the record on both legal and factual issues. 
This scope of review of equity cases is founded in the Utah 
Constitution. 
The appeal shall be upon the record made 
in the court below ... In equity cases the 
appeal may be on questions of both law 
and fact ... 
(Utah Const. art. 8, §9). 
The subject matter of the stipulation is therefore 
difficult to ascertain, but appellants will proceed on the 
basis that the operative physical facts evidenced by the 
file were the subject of the stipulation and that the infer-
ences therefrom, with questions of intent, understanding, 
and belief were not conceded by either party. 
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Essentially the same language is found in Rule 72(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In equity cases the appeal may be on questions 
of both law and fact. 
Thus, where the decision below was bottomed in equity and 
where the appellant questions the findings of fact, it is 
the duty of the appellate court to review the accuracy of 
both the findings of fact and conclusions of law. This is 
not a judicial burden that can be passed over lightly in an 
effort to get at the "real arguments". In the instant case, 
appellants believe that judicial cognizance of this rule may 
be requisite to their obtaining a full and fair hearing on 
the facts and issues of the case. 
Under Article VIII, Section IX, Constitution 
of Utah, it is both ~he duty and prerogative 
of this court in an equitable action to re-
view the law and the facts and make its own 
findings and substitute its judgment for that 
of the trial court. (Mitchell v. ~itchell, 
527 P.2d 1359, 1360 (Utah 1974)). 
See also Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 912, 69 A.L.R. 
1416 (1928). 
That this Court has such broad review power is 
evident by the customary appellate disposition of equity 
cases where the evidence is not found lacking. Generally, 
this Court has not remanded equity cases after appellate re-
view, but rather has entered or directed judgment. 
In view, therefore, that this is purely an 
equitable proceeding which comes to this 
court upon questions of both law and fact, 
we have the power, and it is our duty, to 
either make findings and render judgment in 
accordance with the facts and the law applic-
able thereto, or direct that such findings 
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and judgment be made and entered by the 
court below. (Johnson v. Seagull Inv. Co., 
65 Utah 424, 237 P.945, 948 (1925). 
See also St. George and Washington Canal Co. v. Hurricane Canal 
Co., 93 Utah 262, 72 P.2d 642 (1937). As was stated in a 
c-e.-:c!'r Oklahoma case, Matter of Reyna, 546 P.2d 622, (Okla. 
1976): 
In a case of equitable cognizance, the 
Supreme Court may weigh the evidence and 
enter such judgment as the trial court 
should have rendered. 
(546 P.2d at 625). 
Entry of judgment by the appellate court is made 
following th2 review of equity cases because the appellate 
court has full power to find the facts, make conclusions of 
law, and enter judgment. Of course, where the court feels 
there is more necessary evidence available, not in the record, 
it may remand for further taking of evidence, either retain-
ing the case for proceedings after the further evidence is 
gathered or remanding it entirely for both findings and con-
clusions in the lower court. 
In this case, the parties stipulated at the hearing 
on the motions for summary judgment that they would submit 
the case on the evidence in the file at that date. (T 7:28-
8:5) Appellants contend that the findings entered on the 
order appealed from do not reflect the facts as stipulated. 
For this reason, review of the factual, as well as legal 
ia6U~b 1b sougl1t by the appellants. It is the duty of this 
Court to make independent findings and substitute its judg-
ment for that of the trial court. 
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POINT II 
(Procedural) 
APPLICABLE STA.'1DARDS FOR REVIEW 
FAVOR THE APPELLANT IN THIS CASE 
Because of the different nature of the proceedings 
which respectively result in summary judgment and judgment 
after trial, the standards for review of each type of judg-
ment are different. A presumption of validity attaches to 
a judgment after trial, whereas summary judgments must be 
strictly scrutinized to ensure their propriety. 
a. The Presump_tio~ Favoring Validity of Judgment After 
Trial Is Not A~plicable in This Case. 
Because of the advantageous position of the judge 
as a trier of fact, viewing and evaluating the credibility 
of witnesses, the trial court's judgment after trial is gen-
erally presumed valid. On review, the evidence must clearly 
preponderate against the findings of fact in order for an 
appellate court to reverse the trial court's order. In 
Stanley v. Stanl~. 97 Utah 520, 94 P.2d 465 (1939), Justice 
Wolfe, concurring specially on this issue, noting the exis-
tence of many statements of this presumption in Utah case 
pr~cedent, concluded that whatever presumption of validity 
was to be given the trial judge's findings was due to his 
presence at the trial. 
In Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P. 2d 513, 
520, 101 A.L.R. 532, a well considered case, it 
was stated: 'After a can' f:.:l ,_·eadin:; of the 
entire testimony of this witness, and weighing 
the same along with the admitced facts in the 
case, we do not feel satisfied that the finding 
ought to be disturbed. The trial judge did 
not accept the testimony of this witness in full. 
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The trial judge had a better opportunity from 
seeing and hearing the witness than we have 
from merely reading the transcript to appraise 
his credibility and to determine what weight 
would be given to his testimony. The opinion 
of the trial judge is therefore entitled to 
some weight with us.' 
Other cases containing similar expressions 
are as follows: Williams v. Peterson, 86 Utah 
526, 46 P.2d 674; Silver King Consol. Mining 
Co. v. Sutton, 85 Utah 297, 39 P.2d 682; Corey 
v. Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.2d 940; Consolidated 
Wagon & Machine Co. v. Kay, 81 Utah 595, 21 P.2d 
836; Holman v. Christensen, 73 Utah 389, 274 P. 
457; Warner v. Tyng Warehouse Co., 71 Utah 303, 
265 P. 748; Ephraim Willow Creek Irr. Co. v. 
Olson, 70 Utah 95, 258 P. 216; Shulder v. Dickson, 
66 Utah 418, 243 P. 377; Jenkins v. Nicolas, 63 
Utah 329, 226 P. 177; McKellar Real Estate & In-
vestment Co. v. Paxton, 62 Utah 97, 218 P. 128; 
Lawley v. Hickenlooper, 61 Utah 298, 212 P. 526; 
Bracken v. Chadburn, 55 Utah 430, 185 P. 1021; 
Kinsman v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 53 Utah 10, 177 
P. L~l8; Campbell v. Gowans, 35 Utah 268, 100 P. 
397, 23 L.R.A. ,N.S., 414, 19 Ann.Cas. 660 (fol-
lowed in Utah Com. & Savings Bank v. Fox, 44 Utah 
323, 140 P. 660; and Little v. Stringfellow, 
46 Utah 576, 151 P. 347): Fares v. Urban, 46 Utah 
609, 151 P. 57; Froyd v. Barnhurst, 83 Utah 271, 
28 P. 2d 135; Paxton v .· Paxton, 80 Utah 540, -15 
P.2d 1051; Thomas v. Butler, 77 Utah 402, 296 P. 
597; Clark v. Clark, 74 Utah 290, 279 P. 502; 
Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P. 313 (and 
cases cited); Singleton v. Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 
212 P. 63 (and cases cited); Rieske v. Hoover, 
53 Utah 87, 177 P. 228. 
The reason then that we have the expressions 
that in order to reverse there must be shown a 
'clear preponderance' or 'fair preponderance' of 
the evidence the other way or that we must 'bear 
in mind legal presumptions in favor of the judg-
ment' etc., is because of this recognition that 
the lower court had the witnesses before it and 
was better able to judge of their credibility. 
(94 P.2d at 468). 
See also T~~00cs Highlands v. Harper, 544 P.2d 481 (Utah 
-21-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The presumption favo~ing the trial court's find-
ings because of his ability to judge the credibility of 
witnesses is obviously not applicable in the instant case 
where no witnesses were presented and the judgment was 
made on the "cold record." In this case, an appellate 
court is as well suited as the trial court to evaluate the 
credibility of witnesses and the weight of evidence because 
the method of presentation of evidence is identical. 
b. In Appeals From Summll£Y_ Judgments Inferences Are to be 
Drawn Favorably to the Appellant. 
At the hearing resulting in the order from which 
this appeal is taken, two motions for summary judgment were 
under consideration. Appellants moved for summary judgment 
on their complaint and against respondent on his counterclaim. 
Respondent moved for summary judgment on his counterclaim. 
The court was required to consider, in each motion 
for surrnnary judgment, the evidence and inferences therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the party opposing that par-
ticular motion. The court found against the appellants on 
their motion for summary judgment and found for the 
respondent on his motion. Apparently, the court found that 
viewing the evidence and inferences therefrom most favorably 
to the appellants, the respondent was entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. It is incredible that the lm·1er court could 
find, before one witness had taken the stand, that the evi-
dence in the file considered favorably to the appellants 
met the high evidentiary standard required to support a 
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decree for specific performance in favor of the respondent, 
viz, free from doubt, vagueness and ambiguity. Pitcher v. 
Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967). 
In this review, this Court also must consider the 
evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs-appellants, 
drawing all inferences in their favor. 
The pertinent inquiry is whether under any view 
of the facts the plaintiff could recover. It 
is acknowledged that in the face of a motion 
for dismissal on summary judgment, the plain-
tiff is entitled to have the trial court, and 
this court on review, consider all of the evi-
dence which plaintiff is able to present and 
every inference and intendment fairly arising 
therefrom in the light most favorable to him. 
(Abdulkadir v. Western Pacific Railroad Com-
~· 7 Utah 2d 53, 57, 318 P.2d 339 (1957) 
(footnote omitted)). 
c. Standards for Review Favor the Appellant in This Case. 
This Court, in review of the summary judgment below 
decreeing specific performance,, must consider both the facts 
and the law in this case. The general presumption in favor 
of a trial court's findings does not apply as there was no 
observation of witnesses to afford the trial court that pre-
sumption. Further, the nature of an appeal from summary 
judgment requires that the Court consider the evidence 
and inferences in a light most favorable to appellants. Thus, 
this Court has a duty to consider the issues of both law 
and fact, to consider those issues without favor toward 
the findings below, and to draw inferences in favor of the 
appellant. 
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POINT III 
(Evidentiary) 
A HIGH EVIDENTIARY STANDARD MUST BE :1ET 
TO SUPPORT A DECREE FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMA.~CE 
The nature of the remedy of specific performance 
requires that the respondent meet a high evitlentiary stan-
dard to justify a decree in his favor. This is necessary 
because courts cannot create rights between parties; they 
may only confirm and enforce existing rights. The courts 
therefore require clear and certain proof as to all material 
terms of a contract before enforcement will be decreed. A 
recent Utah case, Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 
423 P.2d 491, 493 (1967), has succinctly stated these re-
quirements: 
In speaking of certain terms required for 
specific performance, the author in 49 Am.Jur., 
Specific Performance, Section 22, at page 35 
uses this language: 
The contract must be free from doubt, vague-
ness, and ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to 
conjecture or to be supplied by the court. It 
must be sufficiently certain and definite in its 
terms to leave no reasonable doubt as to what 
the parties intended, and no reasonable doubt 
of the specific thing equity is called upon to 
have performed, and it must be sufficiently 
certain as to its terms so that the court mav 
enforce it as actually made by the parties. - A 
greater degree of certainty is required for 
specific performance in equity than is necessary 
to establish a contract as the basis of an action 
at law for damages. 
As noted in Pitcher, a very high degree of proof is required. 
71 Am.Jur. 2d Specific Performance §208 (1973) 
states the standard as follows: 
Where an action is brought for specj_fic per-
formance, the established rule is that more 
than a mere preponderance of testimony is 
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required to establish the existence of the con-
tract when its existence is denied. In order 
that specific performance of a contract may be 
decreed, the evidence of the making of the con-
tract must be clear and convincing, or as stated 
in some cases, clear, cogent, and convincing, or 
strong and conclusive. 
This burden of clear and definite proof must be met as to each 
element of the contract. 
Specific performance cannot be required unless 
all terms of the agreement are clear. The court 
cannot compel the performance of a contract which 
the parties did not mutually agree upon. (Pitcher, 
~. at 493, citing Bowman v. Reyburn, 155 Colo. 
8--z-;-T70 P.2d 271 (1946)). 
In Pitcher, specific performance sought on an earnest 
money agreement was denied because a map designating the land 
to be conveyed was never attached thereto as recited. The 
contract as written was incomplete and therefore not a proper 
subject for specific enforcement. 
The Bowman opinion, re~erred to in Pitcher, explained 
the rationale for such strict requirements of proof, citing 
Adams v. Henderson, 168 U.S. 573, 18 S.Ct. 179, 42 L.Ed. 584 
(1897) : 
'Equity,' this court said in Hunt v. Rousmaniere's 
Adm'rs, 1 Pet. 1, 14, 7 L.Ed. 27, 'may compel 
parties to perform their agreements, when fairly 
entered into, according to their terms; but it 
has no power to make agreements for parties, and 
then compel them to execute the same. The former 
is a legitimate branch of its jurisdiction, and 
in its exercise is highly beneficial to society. 
The latter is without its authority, and the 
exercise of it would be highly mischievous in 
its consequences.' 
[I]t must be clearly establish~d that the demanded 
performance is in accordance with the actual 
agreement of the parties. (170 P.2d at 276). 
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In this case, it is not clear that any contract 
has arisen. The terms of the "contract" are in may respects 
vague and uncertain. The Option Agreement, upon which re-
spondent bases his claim against Mrs. Sandberg was never 
completed as contemplated by the parties. Not only has re-
spondent failed to prove a clear mutual understanding on 
unambigous terms, he has failed to prove the existence of 
a contract. And certainly his proof is not clear and con-
vincing. 
Beyond the deficiency of proof, a variance of 
proof from the pleadings is fatal. Respondent alle8ed in 
his counterclaim that the real estate purchase contract he 
drafted represents the agreement he has with Mrs. Sandberg 
and that the property described as "Exhibit A" in said con-
tract was that certain property referred to in both the 
Earnest Money Receipt and Option Agreement. (R. 121, 170; 
CRK n1, 3, 4 and 6, R. 166-168) Thus, if this court finds 
that the real estate purchase contract is materially differ-
ent from the Option Agreement, it must reverse, for that 
reason alone, and respondent would not be entitled to a de-
cree. 
In an action for specific performance the proof 
must conform to the pleading. Accordingly, 
plaintiff must prove the contract as laid in 
the bill and he cannot recover on some other 
contract . (81 C.J.S. Specific Performance 
§139c (1953)). 
Appellants contend that the deficiency and variance 
of proof require reversal of the judgment below. 
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POINT IV 
(Evident i ary) 
UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
ONLY THE EAR.NEST MONEY RECEIPT AND OPTION AG!U:EMENT 
MAY BE CONSIDERED AS COMPETENT EVIDENCE AGAINST MRS. SANDBERG 
In the present case, the documents presented by 
respondent as the basis of his claim for specific perfor-
mance include the Earnest Money Receipt of April 4, 1962 
and the Option Agreement of September 21, 1964. (CRK VV 1 
and 3, R. 166) The lower court relied on those documents 
and letter of March 30, 1971, was exercising the option and 
forming an enforceable contract. Apparently these documents, 
in the mind of the lower court, constituted a sufficient 
memorandum of sale under the Statute of Frauds to grant 
specific performance. 
The Statute of Frauds, Utah Code Ann. 25-5-1 et 
seq., declares certain classes of agreements (designated by 
subject matter) invalid unless such agreements are in writ-
ing and signed by the party to be charged. The rationale 
of requiring a signed writing is basically for evidentiary, 
cautionary, and protective reasons. 
Contracts for the conveyance of land are covered 
by the statute. The statute requires that the contract 
designate the parties, identify the land to be conveyed, 
recite the consideration therefor, and contain the signature 
of at least the party to be charged. The effect of the 
statute is to exclude all evidence of a contract which is 
not in writiri~ o:nci signed by the party to be charged. The 
reo":~"'r;ients of the statute are thus more stringent than 
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and independent from those of the parol evidence rule. 
The parol evidence rule only excludes evidence of prior 
and contemporaneous statements proferred to vary or con-
tradict the terms of a written instrument, but it does 
allow evidence of agreements subsequent to the writing 
and allows extrinsic evidence to clarify a writing. 
The statute of frauds, however, effectually pro-
hibits parol evidence which would add to or contradict an 
existing writing or evidence a separate agreement, whether 
prior, contemporaneous, or subsequent, by forbidding judicial 
enforcement of such terms or agreements. Therefore, as to 
contracts designated within the statute of frauds, parol evi-
dence is admissable only to clarify the writing, not to 
add to or subtract from it. 
The requirement of a signature of the party to be 
charged is made to ensure the validity of the alleged con-
tract. It is often said that only the signature of the party 
to be charged is required because the other party admits 
the contract by suing thereon and seeking the benefits there-
from. It is also generally accepted that parol evidence 
may show acceptance of a written option because a true accept-
ance adds no terms to the option; otherwise such "acceptance" 
would amount to a counteroffer. 37 C.J.S. Frauds, Statute of 
§281 (1943). 
Where separate writings each signed by the party 
to be charged are available, they together may constitute 
a sufficient memorandum. Or, a writing signed by the pa.rt:y 
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to be charged referring to an unsigned writing may create 
a valid memorandum by incorporation. However, "[a] paper 
signed by the party to be charged cannot be incorporated in 
a paper not signed by him by a reference in the latter 
[unsigned docur:ient]." 37 C.J.S., Frauds, Statute of §178 
(1943). 
Therefore, the letter of March 30, 1971, cannot be 
considered as a memorandum to be held against Mrs. Sandberg. 
Only the Earnest ~1oney Receipt and Option Agreement may be 
relied on in a claim 2_gainst her for only those documents 
bear her signature. Respondents apparently realized this 
and pled only those documents in their counterclaim. The 
lower court failed to realize that the letter of March 30, 
1971, was incompetent evidence as to any claim against Mrs. 
Sandberg and instead considered it as forming some of the mater-
ial terms of the "contract" sought to be enforced against Mrs. 
Sandberg. Of course, that letter may be admissible for the 
alleged purpose of showing that Klein exercised the option in 
accordance with its terms, but it may neither add to, alter, 
or subtract from the contractual 4 liability of Mrs. Sandberg. 
The case of Lewis v. Elliot Bay Lodging Co., 112 
Wash. 83, 191 P. 803 (1920), is analagous to the present 
4While considering the effect of the Statute of Frauds 
it sho,_,ld be noted, particularly with respect to the argument 
"'' Lite lack of mutuality under the contract allegedly formed 
by the Option Agreement, and the letter of March 30, 1971, 
that there is no evidence that the March 30, 1971, letter was 
ever signed by Klein. No copies of that document in the record 
appear with his signature. See R. 71-73, 102-104, 207-209, 
249-251, 305-307; Probate Record 76-78. No copies of that docu-
ment could have been relied upon by Mrs. Sandberg in a claim 
against Klein. 
-29-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
situation. In Lewis, the Washington Supreme Court consid-
ered letters of the respective parties to determine if a 
sufficient memorandum existed to charge the seller. Of 
course, the seller's signature appeared only on his offering 
letter which the court found contained an insufficient de-
scription of the alleged contract's subject matter. Although 
the buyer's letter of acceptance contained the requisite 
additional descriptive terms, the Lewis Court correctly held 
that the obviously responsive acceptance could not cure the 
defect in the seller's offer. 
Respondent cites a number of cases upon this 
question, all of which have been carefully 
read and considered, but none of them would 
sustain a holding that the appellant could be 
charged upon a memorandum which it did not 
sign, and which designated the quantity, 
where the writing signed by the appellant 
did not sufficiently designate the subject-
matter in that respect. They are cases where 
the party sought to be charged signed a 
memorandum which contained all the essential 
terms of the car.tract, and which was simply 
accepted by the opposite party, or cases 
where the party sought to be charged had 
accepted the terms as they were written 
by the opposite party. They are therefore 
not applicable to the facts in the case 
now before us. (191 P. at 804). 
Though the acceptance in Lewis was obviously related -co the 
deficient offer and received without protest by the offeror, 
it was not competent evidence against him and could not 
supply the subject matter description, for it did not bear 
his signature. Even if the offeror had orally agreed, sue·· 
sequent to the writings, that the subject matter description 
in the acceptance was correct, the evidence of that agreement 
would not have been competent against him. Though the parol 
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evidence rule would facially allow such evidence of such 
a subsequent parol agreement, the statute of frauds prohib-
its it because it would alter the signed writing. Thus, any 
enlargement or addition of terms by a source external to 
the writings bearing the signature of the party to be 
charged violates the Statute of Frauds. 
While appellants do not feel that the lower court's 
consideration of a plethora of evidence clarifed the terms of 
the written memoranda, the refusal to limit evidence in accord-
ance with the Statute of Frauds was clearly improper and 
allowed a mass of paper unilaterally supplied by respondent 
to be considered as binding Mrs. Sandberg. When this Court 
considers the evidence, properly charging Mrs. Sandberg with 
only those writings bearing her signature, it will be appar-
ent that she has no contractual· liability to Klein. None-
theless, while the parol evidence proffered by Klein in 
purporting to add to the writ·ings is incompentent and in-
admissable, it does not clarify the writings, but merely 
highlights their ambiguity. 
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PART TWO - THE OPTION AGREEMENT IS NOT 
A DOCUMENT SUSCEPTIBLE OF 
SPfefFTcfNroF:CE:ME:Nl'--
POINT V 
THE OPTION AGREEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 1, 1964 
IS AN AGREEHENT TO AGREE; 
AS SUCH IT MAY NOT BE JUDICIALLY ENFORCED 
In 1970 the Utah Supreme Court in Jensen v. Ander-
son, 24 Utah 2d 191, 468 P.2d 366 (1970), stated the fundamen-
tal and uniform rule that option agreements are to be 
strictly construed against the party drawing such agreements 
where uncertainty and ambiguity appears. The option agree-
ment upon which respondent Klein seeks specific performance 
was admittedly drawn and prepared by him. (AnRK No. 14, 
R. 69) Thus, where ambiguity or uncertainty exists in the 
Option Agreement, it must be construed in favor of Wanda 
Sandberg and against the respondent who relies on that docu-
ment for specific performance. 
a. Contracts Expressly Leaving Material Terms To Future 
Mutual Agreement Are Unenforceable. 
A defect common to all types of contracts is the 
deletion of essential terms. Often, courts can supply the 
terms by implication when the deficiency is the result of 
inadvertence and the term is one of standard use. However, 
where it is apparent that the parties have failed to complete 
their contract by expressly leaving essential terms to their 
future mutual agreement, courts will not enforce the writing 
that represents their preliminary agreement to agree at a 
later date. 
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Option agreements are frequently objectionable 
on the ground that they constitute agreements to agree. Of 
course, by their nature, option agreements contemplate a 
future contract (upon the optionee's exercise of the option), 
but often the parties leave terms to their future agreement, in-
stead of placing all the material terms in the opticn. An 
option must contain all the material terms to be susceptible 
of a binding acceptance. An acceptance adding terms is a 
counteroffer, so also, an option leaving terms to be spell2d out 
by the acceptance or by future m~tual agreement is not suscep-
tible of unilateral acceptance. 
Courts will not enforce agreements to agree because 
they cannot compel a nonconsenting party to agree to new and 
unilaterally proposed terms. In effect, such an indulgence 
would be to judicially impose a state of mind on the object-
ing party, compelling that party to agree. Courts uniformly 
admit that even equity does not possess these ubiquitous powers, 
nor will the courts intervene to ~ake, alter or substantially 
add to contracts as actually written and entered into by the 
parties. For example, in Lucey v. Hero International Corp-
1 oration, 281 N.E.2d 266 (Mass. 1962), the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court considered a contract to purchase land which 
granted plaintiff "an option to purchase additional land be-
longing to ... [the defendant], which said land shall be 
northerly of the conveyed premises and along Lennox Road 
as mutually .-,greed upon by both parties." 281 N. E. 2d at 268. 
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In reversing the lower court's decree of specific perform-
ance in favor of the plaintiff-optionee, the Massachusetts 
Court stated that the holding below that the optionee could 
unilaterally select the property he desired would "ignore 
the very words of the provision." 281 N.E.2d at 270. Had 
the option provided for a unilateral selection of land, 
there would have been no question of its validity. Courts 
may compel a party to act and make a selection, but cannot 
compel two parties to agree. Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 
2d 338, 517 P. 2d 1026 (1973); Calder v. Third Judicial 
District Court, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168 (1954). The 
words of the Massachusetts court in denying specific en-
forcement are precise and definitive: 
We are also of the opinion that the option 
agreement is too indefinite to be specifically 
enforced. For that additional reason, the 
final decree is wrong. 'An option to purchase 
real estate is a unilateral contract by which 
the owner of the property agrees with the hold-
er of the option that he has the right to buy 
the property according to the terms and con-
ditions of the contract.' (citations omitted) 
Since, therefore, an option is a contract, 
'[a)ll the essential terms ... must be definite 
and certain so that the intention of the par-
ties may be discovered, the nature and extent 
of their obligations ascertained and their 
rights determined.' (citations omitted) 'The 
court cannot make for the parties a contract 
which they did not make for themselves.' 
(citations omitted) (Id. at 269) 
In Applebaug~1 v. Hohl, 535 P.2d 222 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1975), the Colorado Court of Appeals considered an 
earnest money receipt to purchase three lots of a sub-
division. Specifically set forth in the earnest money 
receipt was the total sales price of $11,000.00, with 
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acknowledgment of a down payment of $1,000.00 by the plain-
tiff-purchaser. In his complaint the plaintiff offered 
to pay the $10,000.00 balance remaining on the purchase 
price. The Colorado Court, however, agreed with the defen-
dant's contentions that the memorandum of sale was unilateral 
and not mutually binding or enforceable despite the fact 
that it contained "many of the terms that would be included 
in an option." 535 P.2d at 224. The problematic clause in 
the memorandum was the phrase "pending a mutually acceptable 
contract to be furnished by buyer." Id. at 223. In holding 
the memorandum of sale unenforceable the Court agreed that 
it constituted merely an invitation to negotiate further and 
that "[t]o have an enforceable contract or option, it must 
appear that further negotiations are not required to work 
out important and essential terms." Id. at 224. 
Similar to Lucey and Applebaugh is the California 
case of Roberts v. Adams, 330 P.2d 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958). 
In Roberts, the California Court of Appeals considered 
a suit for specific performance on a term in a lease provid-
ing an option to purchase certain real property for a sum 
of $85,000.00 "payable as mutually agreed by both parties." 
The California appellate court stated that it is "Hornbook 
law that an agreement to make an agreement is nugatory, and 
that this is true of material terms of any contract." 
330 P.2d at 901. The policy for the Roberts holding was 
then further clarified: 
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Since either party by the terms of the promise 
may refuse to agree to anything to which the 
other party will agree, it is impossible for 
the law to affix any obligation to such a 
promise. (Id. at 902, citing 1 Williston on 
Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1936) §45 at lJT) ____ _ 
Several Utah decisions expressly recognize these 
propositions. For example, it is accepted in Utah that in 
order to be binding and enforceable a contract must set 
forth with sufficient definiteness all of its terms so that 
each party knows what is required of him. Kier v. Condrack, 
25 Utah 2d 139, 478 P.2d 327 (1970); Efco Distributing 
Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 412 P.2d 615 (1966); 
Owyhee, Inc. v. Robbins Marco Polo, 17 Utah 2d 181, 407 P.2d 
565 (1965); Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 
(1962); Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 362 P.2d 
427 (1961); Hansen v. Snell, 11 Utah 2d 64, 354 P.2d 1070 
(1960); and Pelton's Spudnuts v. Doan, 120 Utah 366, 
234 P.2d 852 (1951). As a corollary to the above, it has 
been held that specific performance of an option agreement 
cannot be decreed unless all of its terms are clear, since 
the courts cannot compel performance of a contract upon 
which the parties did not mutually agree. Pitcher v. Laur-
itzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967). 
Thus, when material terms of a contract are left 
to the future agreement of the parties, such contracts are 
nugatory as agreements to agree. In cases where the material 
provision to be agreed upon is the selection of lands covered 
by the writing, it has been further held that such a designa-
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d 
tion in the contract not only violates the prohibition against 
enforcement of agreements to agree but also does not provide 
a description sufficient and tenable under the Statute of 
Frauds. Thus, where parties leave the selection of the 
tract to be conveyed under the written memorandum to future 
mutual agreement, the memorandum is deficient under the 
Statute of Frauds in that the description of land itself 
cannot be accurately platted from the memorandum, because 
the memorandum's very teTillS require another agreement. See 
Calder v. Third Judicial District, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 
168 at 170 (1954), citing Scanlan v. Oliver, 42 Minn. 538, 
34 N.W. 1031 (1890), which distinguished cases where the 
contract of sale gave one of the parties thereto a right 
of selection from those cases in which the particular piece 
of property to be conveyed was. to be mutually agreed upon 
between the parties, findir.g the former valid, the latter 
unenforceable. See also Annot., Sufficiency, Under the 
Statute of Frauds, of Description or Designation of Land 
in Contract or Memorandum of Sale Which Gives RiRht to 
Select the Tract to be Conveyed, 46 A.L.R. 2d 894 (1956). 
As a rule, therefore, a provision requiring future 
agreement of the parties on any material term of a contract 
renders that contract unenforceable. The requirements of 
the Statute of Frauds further prohibits such enforcement when 
the material term to be agreed upon is the particular piece 
' of real property to be conveyed by the writing. Davison v. 
Robbins, 30 Utah 338, 517 P.2d 1026(1973). 
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The Davison case constitutes a definitive state-
ment of Utah law on agreements to agree and the dual faceted 
objection to such agreements when they pertain to the selec-
tion of real property, i.e., that such agreements violate 
both the prescyiption against enforcement of agreements 
to agree and the Statute of Frauds. In Davison, plaintiffs, 
approached defendants with an offer to purchase a parcel 
of property for $90.00 per acre. The parties executed a 
purchase contract which provided that defendant-sellers were 
to order a survey to determine the net acreage to be 
conveyed after sellers' deduction of a reserved area desig-
nated as the "bottom land". After sellers' reservation of 
"bottom land" the final sale was made contingent on plain-
tiff-buyers' approval of the net acreage description. 
The plaintiff-buyers attempted to define the 
term "bottom land" through parol, testifying that defen-
dant-sellers had pointed the certain fence lines, posts, 
and a highway to delineate the property to be retained. 
Though defendant-sellers vigorously denied this testimony 
the findings of the trial court reflected a belief in 
the plaintiff-buyers' parol version of the transaction. 
Immediately prior to trial, defendant-sellers indicated 
that they had elected to reserve from the sale all of 
their property (presumably as "bottom land") except for 
one acre. Nonetheless, the trial court found the contract 
valid and enforceable and that plaintiff-buyers were en-
titled to specific performance. 
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had: 
Defendants claimed on appeal that the trial court 
1. Erred in admitting parol evidence indicating 
defendants' intention to reserve certain land 
within existing land marks, and 
2. That the contract constituted merely an 
agreement to agree in the future leaving the 
matter of the reservation of acreage and that 
acreage conveyed open to future mutual agree-
ment. 
Relying on Calder v. Third Judicial District Court, 
supra, this Court distinguished a fact situation wherein one 
party was specifically granted the exclusive right to select 
the property and the contract in Davison wherein the piece 
of property to be conveyed was to be mutually agreed upon 
by the parties. After distinguishing the two fact situations, 
the Utah Supreme Court, ruling on both the agreement to agree 
objection and the parol evidence objection, held as follows: 
In the instant action, the agreement in 
clear and unambiguous terms provided that the 
location and description of the land to be con-
veyed was subject to the future mutual agree-
ment of the parties·. This writing constituted 
a mere expression of a purpose to make a contract 
in the future for the whole matter was contingent 
on further negotiation. The trial court erred 
in its conclusion that the writing constituted 
a valid, enforceable contract. 
Defendants further contend that the agree-
ment does not describe the property to be 
reserved with sufficient certainty to support 
a decree of specific performance, and the 
trial court erred in admitting parol evidence 
to cure this defective description. 
Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not 
to supply, a description of lands in the con-
tract. Parol evidence will not be admitted 
to complete a defective description, or to 
show the intention with which it was made. 
Parol evidence may be used for the purpose of 
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identifying the description contained in the 
writing with its location upon the ground, 
but not for the purpose of ascertaining and 
locating the land about which the parties 
negotiated, and supplying the description 
thereof which they have omitted from t~e 
writing. There is a clear distinction be-
tween the admission of oral and extrinsic 
evidence for the purpose of identifying the 
land described and applyin~ the description 
to the property and that of supplying and 
adding to a description insufficient and void 
on its face. (30 Utah 2d at 341 (footnote 
omitted)) 
Again Davison evinced a two-pronged attack on the 
enforceability of the contract that was before the Court: 
1. The contract by its own terms contemplated 
further negotiations and was void and uneforce-
able. 
2. As the contemplated future negotiation 
dealt with the selection of land, the land 
description was insufficient under the Statute 
of Frauds and could not be remedied by 
the admission of parol evidence. 
There is authority which seems to suggest that even 
leaving future agreement as an alternative to specified terms 
may result in a contract being found unenforceable. For example.I 
I 
in Kline v. Rogerson, 181 P.2d 385 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947), 
the California district court of appeals held that a plaintiff 
' 
seller could not enforce an agreement of purchase and sale agaim! 
aefendant since it provided that the balance of the purchase 
price was to be paid "at $5,000 or more per year, plus inter-
est at 5/'. or terms to mutual satisfaction." 181 P.2d 387. 
The defendant-buyer refused to pay $5,000.00 per year 
and sought a renegotiation at $2,000.00 per year. The 
Court denied a decree of specific performance stating that 
the parties never agreed upon terms which were mutually 
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satisfactory. Though it would seem that the defendant should 
have been held to his agreement to pay $5,000.00 per year, 
the court apparently felt that the alternative provision for 
mutu~l agreement, in light of his refusal to perform according 
to the specific provision rendered the contract unenforceable. 
Kline is authority for the proposition that providing for a 
future agreement only as an alternative renders a contract 
void. 
b. The Option Agreement was an Agreement to Agree. 
In light of the foregoing analysis, appellants urge 
that the trial court's finding that the Option Agreement 
dated September 21, 1964, did not constitute an agreement 
to agree is not only untenable but utterly capricious. The 
entire history of the transaction is replete with ·such agree-
ments. It is telling that page 2 of the original Earnest 
Money Receipt gave the buyer 30 days from date hereof to 
enter into an option "on the terms as above set out and on 
such other terms as the parties hereto may agree." When 
the Earnest Money Receipt was ultimately superseded by the 
1°1 Option Agreement which is the subject matter of this case, 
both the appellant Wanda Sanderg and the respondent stated 
the Option Agreement set forth "the terms and conditions of 
said option to purchase, as heretofore granted, together 
with the modification to which the parties have agreed." 
One of the conditions to which the parties agreed was the 
mode of exercising the Option Agreement and more specifically 
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the manner of the selection of land to be included in the 
respondent's ultimate purchase. That mode of selection 
is a singular statement clearly embodying both a necessity 
and an invitation for future negotiations. Quoting from 
paragraph 5 of the Option Agreement: 
5. The Buyer may exercise his right to pur-
chase his property for the sum of Two Hundred 
Dollars ($200.00) per acre at any time during 
the option period, (including any extension 
period) by executing a contract to purchase 
all or such part or parts of the property as 
~arties may agree; such contract to pur-
chase shall provide as follows . . (R. 61 
(emphasis added)) 
The above excerpted paragraph specifies the only 
means of exercising the Option Agreement upon which respond~nt 
seeks specific performance. Clearly, the structure of the 
paragraph in question allows no other interpretation 
than that the future agreement of the parties was required 
as to the amount of the land to be subject to the exercise 
of the option. In order to allow the greatest flexibility 
to themselves, the parties noted that the eventual agree-
ment could cover the whole or one part or many parts of the 
land. The prepositional phrase "as the parties may agree" 
must be construed as modifying the iJTu~ediately preceding 
word "property' , which is in turn modified by the phrase 
"all or such part or parts" This is required by the doc-
trine of "last antecedent" which requires that a qualifier 
refer to the immediately preceding phrase or word. Dunn v. 
Bryan, 77 Utah 604, 299 P.253 (1931). It is telling that 
each of the words "all", "part", and "parts", is clarified 
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by the phrase "of the property" which phrase completes the 
thought for each alternative exercise contemplated by the 
parties. 
That the entire phrase "all or such part or parts 
of the property" is modified by the qualifier requiring 
agreement can also be shown by an examination of the entire 
sentence. Schematically diagrannned the sentence appears as 
follows: 
Buyer--may exercise--right- by executing 
~aZZ-::-:-._ 
contract to purchase...__ such par;_--of the property as 
---..parts 
the parties may agree. 
This disjunction "or" which joins the three words "all", 
"part", and "parts", indicates that each is an alternative 
within the contemplation of the·parties. 
It is clear that substantial modification of the 
contract would be required to. allow interpretation of para-
graph 5 of the Option Agreement as requiring future mutual 
agreement only if the optionee exercised as to a part or 
parts of the greater parcel. Again, the clause in question 
which is before this court appears as follows in the Option 
Agreement: 
... by executing a contract to purchase all or 
such part or parts of the property as the 
parties may agree . . . (R. 61) 
First, a clear disjuntion must be made between "all" and 
"such part or parts". This could be done by insertion of 
a connna, ~· 
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contract to purchase all, or such pa~t or 
parts of the property as the parties may 
agree. 
Second, the preposition object "all" must be completed inde-
pendently of "such part or parts" by the preposition "of the 
property", ~· 
contract to purchase all of the property, or 
such part or parts of the property as the 
parties may agree. 
Finally, the qualifying phrase "as the parties may agree" must 
be made clearly inapplicable to the purchase of "all of the 
property" by making the clauses before and after the disjunc-
tion independent of each other by supplying each other with 
a verb,~· 
contract to purchase all of the property, or 
to purchase such part or parts of the property 
as the parties may agree. 
Such judicial rewriting of the Option Agreement, 
however, is clearly impermissible, as modification may not 
be made in the guise of interpretation. East Mill Creek 
Water Company v. Salt Lake City, 108 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863 
(1945). Further, words, punctuation, and phrases may not 
be supplied where lacking, and adding, ignoring or discarding 
words in the process of interpretation is improper. Cornwall 
v. Willow Creek Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 369 P. 2d 928 
(1962). Alteration of meaning simply may not be made where 
the meaning is clear, and where it is apparent that the par-
ties and the draftsmen could have expressed the:nselves dif-
ferently had they so desired. Simply stated the p&rties 
must be held to their clear and understandable lan3uar,e as 
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conunitted to writing. Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 
2d 276, 323 P.2d 359 (1958). That the parties chose to rely 
on their future mutual agreement as to the selection of land 
upon the exercise of the option does not justify a wholesale 
rewriting of the paragraph simply because the provision 
itself was an improvident one. Skousen v. Smith, 27 Utah 2d 
169, 493 P.2d 1003 (1972); Ephraim Theater v. Hawk, 7 Utah 
2d 163, 321 P.2d 221 (1958). Utah courts when confronted 
with such a contract have neither attempted to redraft its 
terms nor to cure it through parol evidence. In fact the 
Utah courts have uniformly declared such contracts unenforce-
able. Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 
(1973). 
That the language requiring future mutual agree-
ment in all events in the selection of land was purpose-
fully chosen is evident by examination of the rest of the 
contract. In two other paragraphs, future mutual agreement 
was specified as an alternative, and the alternative 
nature of the method is clear. For example, paragraph 5(e) 
provides for release of land upon selection by the Buyer 
of contiguous parcels, or upon agreement of the parties 
if non-contiguous parcels are sought. 
Land to be released shall be selected by the 
Buyer provided such land is contiguously 
6elected or otherwise mutually agreed by 
the parties. 
The method of mutual future agreement is clearly alternative 
to the choice by Buyer of contiguous land. 
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Another provision for future mutual agreement as 
an alternative is found in paragraph 5(b): 
The Buyer shall pay a down payment of Two 
Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) (or such other 
amount as the parties may agree) on said con-
tract ... (R. 61) 
Again, this drafting is clear in providing that the require-
f f 1 1 . 5 ment o uture mutua agreement was a ternative. 
If the parties had intended under paragraph 5 of 
the Option Agreement to require future mutual agreement as 
to the selection of land in only those instances where the 
optionee desired a part or parts of the Sandberg land, then 
the respondent and his attorney clearly had the capacity 
and opportunity to draft the Option Agreement to so indicate. 
The condition of future mutual agreement was not stated as 
an alternative, however, but as a requirement in all 
instances. Many logical explanations exist for the making 
of such a requirement, the most probable being the uncertain-
ty in the minds of the optionor and optionee in 1964 as to 
the amount of land each wished to conm<it to the terms of 
the option. The liberal use by the parties of the method 
of future mutual agreement has already been shown. Under 
apparently amicable circumstances the method did not seem 
at all uncertain, but it is well accepted that equity will 
not compel parties to agree. 
under the 
Dist. Ct. 
5
rt should be noted that each of these provisions 
rule in Kline v. Rogerson, 181 P.2d 385 (Cal. 
App. 1947) may render the contract unenforceable. 
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That the Option Agreement contemplated further 
negotiations pertaining to the land to be included in the 
contract contemplated in the option's exercise is further 
evinced by the letter of respondent Klein dated March 30, 
1971 to Wanda Sandberg. Paragraph 4 of the letter of 
March 30, 1971, reads as follows: 
My interpretation of the number of acres in-
volved essentially corresponds with yours, 
namely that the land Wayne intended to sell 
lies west of the fence line that you and I 
have both seen together. I would like you 
to know that I can apureciate your concern 
that this line be agreed to by both of us. 
As I read the original and supplemental agree-
nent, I have had some questions of interpreta-
tion in ny mm mind, but must conclude in 
good conscience, if you have in fact been 
conducting your feeding operation all these 
years where you presently are now doing so, 
that that property east of the fence clearly 
was to be excluded. I walked the fence line 
the other day and noted that i~ had some 
irregular jogs in it t~at you and I should 
probably discuss in order to assure absolute 
clarification. I see no problem in this 
connection as I am as a matter of personal 
principle disE_?sed to afree with your wishes. 
(R. 71 (emphasis added) 
As can readily be seen, respondent Klein both knew and under-
stood that the boundary lines of any parcel to be selected 
were to be agreed to by both parties and that further clari-
fication was necessary to define the lands to be included 
in the contract. Magnanimously, he indicated that as a 
IDatter of personal principle he would be inclined to agree 
with her wishes, however, he now seeks specific enforce-
ment of a contract pertaining to real property that Mrs. 
Sandberg does not agree to sell. 
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Paragraph 5 of the letter then states as follows: 
If you think ab?ut it, descriptions along section 
or quarter section lines generally arc more easily 
handled. It is for this reason, after careful 
review that I have discribed [sic] the annexation 
description as indicated by the plat which I am 
including with this letter. This description, 
within a few feet, corresponds with the fence 
line that you and I have observed together when 
we last saw each other. This I trust will cor-
~ond with your own interpretation of what 
~r~an:_c_,d-~y~o_u_iri fact oeiieve you are selling. 
Should you still have some apprehensio~_!li_at I 
am not aware of, I am sure that on a face to 
race basis and with the help of a surveyor we 
can resolve fairly to each of our satisfaction 
WFiatever diffenences [sic] of opinion we m_ay 
encounter. I am enclosing a dra·;;ring showing 
my proposed annexation request; not the indica-
tion of the fence line which I have included. 
(R. 71 (emphasis added)) 
Analyzing the fifth paragraph of the March 30, 1971, letter, 
the Court should be aware that neither the Earnest Money 
Receipt nor the Option Agreement ever described land in 
terms of quarter sections. Further, whereas paragraph 4 
of the letter states that some property east of a fence 
was to be excluded from the contract, paragraph 5 indicates 
that the description provided with the letter only "within 
a few feet, corresponds with the fence line . II There-
after Klein expresses his belief that this description will 
correspond with what in fact Mrs. Sandberg believed she was 
selling, and that any differences of opinion be resolved 
by agreement with the help of a surveyor. It is impossible 
to conclude that the Option Agreement did not contemplate 
a future agreement regarding the description of land in the 
ultimate contract. It is impossible to conclude in light of 
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the "exercising" letter that the Option Agreement was not 
an agreement to agree, as the "exercising" letter itself 
indicates the necessity of future agreement and amicable 
cooper'ation. Indeed, on page 2 of his letter to Wanda 
Sandberg (R. 72), respondent Klein states that in April 
and May of 1971 they should "try to ... [p) rep are a land 
purchase agreement consistent with the terms of an option 
agreement and the accepted number of acres involved . " 
Preparation of a land purchase agreement prior to June of 1971 
was crucial because in June of 1971 the Option Agreement expired 
by its own terms. 
This lawsuit, as in Davison presents hard evidence 
that a final agreement was never made. Parol cannot be used 
to supply the terms of such an agreement, and Klein's con-
tract of June of 1972 cannot be enforced against Mrs. Sand-
berg who has not signed the same. The Option Agreement 
clearly provided that in its exercise the selection of 
land was to be made by mutual agreement in the future. 
Davison stands for the clear proposition that such a docu-
ment cannot be judicially enforced simply because the law 
cannot compel someone to attain a state of mind, that is, 
to agree. Further, similar to Davison, it is improper to 
allow the introduction of incompetent parol evidence to 
add to an otherwise facially insufficient description or 
to attest to what the optionor at one time may have agreed. 
Davison, ~; Reed v. Lowe, 8 Utah 39, 29 P. 740 (1892); 
Adams v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465 (1915); Campbell v. 
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Nelson, 102 Utah 78, 125 P.2d 413 (1942); and Holmgren Brothers 
Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611 (Utah 1975). Thus, the Option 
Agreement's manner of exercise as set forth in paragraph 5 
clearly constitutes an agreement to agree, and, as such, 
must be held unenforceable. Further, whatever description 
was provided Mrs. Sandberg with the March 30th letter by 
its own terms and by respondent's own admissions varied 
from prior proposals. Nonetheless, not one of respondent 
Klein's proposals can be aided by parol evidence as the 
land description was to be mutually agreed on. Such parol 
testimony is clearly inadmissible. Davison, supra. 
Respondent Klein may claim that the conveyance 
of 40 acres by Wanda Sandberg constituted some acquiescence 
or be akin to some form of part performance under the contract 
he proposed for her signature. This argument, however, would 
fail on three points: (1) the "exercising" letter of March 
30, 1971, requested that 55 acres be released not 40; (2) 
the contract upon which the respondent seeks specific perfor-
mance was not drafted until May of 1972 and not presented to 
appellant Sandberg until June of 1972, a year after the con-
veyance, and (3) the doctrine of part performance cannot be 
relied on to overcome the proscription of the Statute 
of Frauds because any acts relied on to overcome that pro-
scription must be exclusively referrable to the oral c?ntract. 
Holmgren Brothers Inc., ~· Significantly, the letter of 
March 30 does not refer to Wanda Sandberg's conveyance of 40 
~cres of land, but rather to a release of 55 acres. Further, 
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it is iIT-possible to construe that conveyance as being ex-
clusively referrable to a contract not drafted and indeed 
not in existence until a year later. The respondent simply 
cannot change this chronology nor can this Court legitimate-
ly ignore it. Thus, we urge the Court to reverse the 
trial court's holding not simply to remand on these points: 
(1) Neither in equity nor at law do courts recognize the 
power to compel the appellant to agree. The Option Agree-
ment by its express, concise, and clear terminology con-
stitutes an agreement to agree. (2) Since the land selection 
clause contemplated future agreement, the land description 
in the Option Agreement violates the Statute of Frauds. 
(3) There is no evidence of a clear, definite and mutually 
understood parol contract established by clear, une·quivocal 
and definite testimony, furthermore such parol is incompe-
tent to aid the otherwise insufficient description. 
Indeed, as the letter of March 30, 1971, indicates, 
if Wanda Sandberg had agreed to all of its terms she would 
simply have been saying "I will agree to get together with 
you and agree." To hold otherwise and sustain the trial 
court's finding that the Option Agreement was not an agree-
ment to agree is to ignore its clear language and the 
obvious admissions in respondent's letter. 
c ·.rhc: Option Agreement was not Complete. 
It is essential that a contract, to be specific-
ally enforceable, contain all its terms and be complete. 
Fqilure to annex a document ref erred to in the body of the 
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contract may indicate a failure to reach a complete agreement. 
In Kerr Glass Mfg. Corp. v .. Elizabeth Arden Sales Co~, 141 
P.2d 938 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943), failure to attach building 
plans expressly called for by a lease rendered the lease for 
the land site and proposed building unenforceable. In this 
case, the parties stated in the Option Agreement that the 
property subject to the option was to be 
... more particularly described in Schedule 
A attached hereto, to be sjgned by the par-
ties and made a part hereof for all purposes. 
(R. 60). 
An attachment with a legal descr~ption was to be made so that 
the area of land subject to the option would be certain. The 
signatures of both parties were required to evince the 
approval of the parties to the description. The description 
was to be an integral part of the agreement and at the time 
of the agreement was thought to be of such import as to require 
mutual approval, and subseqt'ent subscription. 
The law provides, where an essential element of the 
:ontract is specifically left for future negotiation, that 
the contract is unenforceable. Were the term one of standard 
usage and merely deleted, the court might imply it. But 
where the provision is specifically reserved for the future 
agreement of the parties, courts can neither imply the term 
nor, can it be gainsaid, compel the agreement. 
The Option Agreement was never completed, as is 
evidenced by the nonexistence of a signed, mutually approved 
attachment. 
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To allow otherwise, that is, to allow the lower 
court to engraft a suitable Exhibit "A" invites several 
possibilities, among which are the description of land 
annexed to the City of St. George and referred to in the 
letter of respondent Klein in March of 1971 and the contract 
description presented in May of 1972 to Mrs. Sandberg for 
her signature as grantor. The folly of this type of judicial 
surgery is the omniscience it necessarily presumes, as Klein 
has indicated he is exercising the option as to the land 
described by both documents, yet neither description conforms 
with the other. (See POINT VI, infra.) As Mr. Klein has 
presented the court with two nonconforming descriptions and 
was clearly unable between March of 1971 and ~ay of 1972 to 
make up his mind as to the lands he desired to submit for 
agreement, it is incongruous that the Court should do it 
for him, and then tell Mrs. Sandberg that the court's choice 
was the one that she and her deceased husband would have 
agreed to, annexed as Exhibit "A", and signed all along in 1964. 
POINT VI 
THE LAND DESCRIPTIONS ARE AMBIGUOUS AND CONTRADICTORY 
Beyond the evidentiary burden of certain and def-
inite proof to support a decree of specific performance, the 
Statute of Frauds requires the land to be conveyed to be iden-
tified with certainty. 
This requirement of certain identification is in 
accordance with the evidentiary, cautionary, and protective 
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policies underlying the Statute. Thus, judicial cognizance 
of contracts with insufficient land descriptions would both 
contravene the legislative exaction of certainty and require t~, 
courts to divine the intent or mutual understanding of the 
parties. 
The test for determining sufficiency for a descrip-
tion of land looks to the specificity and certainty of the 
description contained on the operative memorandum. See 
Annot., Sufficiency of Description of Land in Contract or 
Memorandum of Sale, Under Statute of Frauds, 23 A.L.R. 2d 
6 (1952). A statement of the Utah requirments of specific-
ity of description was made in Jacobsen v. Cox, 115 Utah 
102, 202 P.2d 714, 721 (1949). 
A description is sufficient if when read in 
the light of the circumstances of possession, 
ownership, situation of the parties, and 
their relation to each other and to the 
property, as they were when the writing was 
made, it identifies the propertv. A 
description is sufficient, although vague 
in respect of the boundaries, if it iden-
tifies a specific tract of land when applied 
to the facts on the surface of the earth, 
as where a surveyor with the contract in 
his hands and with the aid of no other means 
than those provided, cculd go to the place 
stated therein and accurately locate the 
land. 49 Arn.Jur., "Statute of Frauds" §348. 
An examination of the Earnest Money Receipt and 
Option Agreement will reveal that the land descriptions there-
on are ambiguous. Neither of the descriptions are capable 
of location by a surveyor. The anbiguities in these 
descriptions, further, are not cured by parol evidence in 
the form of Klein's letter of March 30, 1971, and the 
real estate purchase contract of June, 1972. 
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Respondent Klein has alleged in his counterclaim 
that the descriptions on the Earnest Money Receipt and 
Option Agreement are identical to the description on the 
real estate purchase con tract. (CRK H 1 and 3, R. 166) 
The court below also found these descriptions to be in 
substantial conformity. (Order, ~4, R. 358) Apparently, 
neither the lower court nor ~he respondent has read the 
land descriptions. Not only is conformity doubtful, but 
contradiction is obvious. 
Each of the written descriptions describes the 
land as a large parcel, excepting a certain portion to be 
reserved by the sellers. The Earnest Money Receipt, sub-
scribed to by Mrs. Sandberg, describes the land as follows: 
All land owned by the sellers in Sections 21, 
22, and 27 Township 42 South, Range 15 West, 
S.L.M., consisting, so far as the parties can 
determine at this time of approximately 500 
acres not including, any water or water rights, 
and less the following: 
There is now a reservoir constructed by the 
City of St. George on what the parties believe 
to be the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22, and 
there is an old fence running north and south 
west of this reservoir. The sellers intend 
to reserve from said sale all land in said 
Section 22 which lies east of said fence line, 
it being understood that the exact line will 
have to be determined if and when the option 
hereinafter mentioned is executed. (R. 196) 
The Option Agreement, also signed by Mrs. Sandberg, described 
the land in a similar fashion--as a whole, but with one 
significant change in the excepted portion of the land 
designated by reference to a fence and reservoir: 
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Land owned by the Sellers in Section 21, Sec-
tion 22, and Section 27 of Township 42 South, 
Range 15 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
consisting of approximately 500 acres, which 
property shall be more particularly described 
in Schedule A attached hereto, to be signed 
by the parties and made a part hereof for 
all purposes; not including any water or 
water rights, and excluding all land in the 
Northeast one quarter of the Northeast one 
quarter of Section 22, which lies East of the 
old fence line, which runs North and Southwest 
of the City of St. George reservoir, said ex-
cluded property also to be more particularly 
described in Schedule A attached hereto and 
made a part hereof for all purposes. (R. 59) 
In the first description the reservoir is in the NE 
1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22, and the excepted area is somewhere 
in Section 22. In the latter description, it is not the 
reservoir which is in the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22, but 
the excepted part is now confined to that area. In the 
Earnest Money Receipt's description the excepted part was in 
Section 22--a possible exception of 640 acres, while in the 
Option Agreement, the possibly excepted area is reduced to 
the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of that section, which comprises approximate-
ly 40 acres. 
The letter of March 30, 1971, which is admissible 
as parol evidence only to show an alleged exercise of the 
Option Agreement or to clarify ambiguities in that agreement, 
nonetheless, does not aid the prior descriptions, but con-
fuses further. 
The letter referred to the land only in general ter~ i 
\ 
and did not contain in its text any specific description. Re- ' 
spondent Klein did state, however, that he was only annexing 
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"that land which I am in fact buying from you." (R. 73) 
The annexation plat described the land without exception or 
reservation and in fact contained, 
All of the NE 1/4 Section 22, Less that uortion 
within Washington City. 
All of the NW 1/4 Section 22 lying south of Inter-
state Highway 15. 
All of the NW 1/4 SW 1/4 & E 1/2 SW 1/4 Section 22. 
All of the E 1/2 NE 1/4 Section 21 lying south of 
Interstate Highway 15. 
NE 1/4 SE 1/4 Section 21. 
All of Sectional lots 1 & 2 Section 22. 
All being located in T.42S., R.15W., Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
(R. 109(emphasis added)) 
The description in the real estate contract submitted 
by Klein, held by the lower court to be in conformity with 
the description in the Option Agreement (Order ~4, R. 358), 
would most certainly conform to the annexation plat as Klein 
in his purported letter of exercise stated that he was annexing 
"only that land which I [he] am [was] in fact buying from 
you [Sandberg]." (R. 73) Nonetheless, the description 
on the contract in attempting to describe a fence and reserve 
the area east of the fence to the prospective seller, 
reserves land to Mrs. Sandberg in both the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of 
Section 22 AND in the SE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22: 
The following described property located in Washing-
ton County, State of Utah, Township 42 South, 
Range 15 West: 
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Section 22: 
The Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter; 
the Northeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter; 
the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter; 
the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter; 
the Northeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter. 
Also, 
Beginning in an existing fence line at its inter-
section with the north line of Section 22, T42S, 
Rl5W, SLB&M which point is 12.2 feet west from a 
stone mound marking the NE corner NW 1/4 NE 1/4 
said Section 22 and running thence S 0°14' W 
1338.5 feet along said fence line, thence S 
89°36' 30" E 443.0 feet along said fence, thence 
S 10°09'30" W 405.0 feet along said fence, thence 
S 83°49'30" W 107.0 feet along said fence, thence 
S 12°40'10" W 910.49 feet, more or less, along 
said fence to the South line NE 1/4 said Section 
22, thence west 1380 feet to the SW corner said 
NE 1/4, thence north 2640 feet to the N 1/4 cor-
ner said Section 22, thence east 1307.8 feet to 
the point of beginning. Containing 86.84 acres, 
more or less. 
Section 21: 
The Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter; 
the Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter. 
Section 27: 
All of sectional lot 1 consisting of approximate-
ly 19 acres; all of sectional lot 2 consisting of 
approximately 47 acres. 
All of said property consisting of approximately 
431. 34 acres. (R. 328) 
The description of Section 22 on the real estate pur· 
chase contract which purports to describe the fence as it 
stands appears graphically as follows. (See also R. 321) 
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Real Estate Purchase 
Section 22 
reserved 
to Mrs. 
Sandberg 
The description pertaining to Section 22 on the 
annexation plat enclosed with t'.1e letter of March 30, 1971, 
which Klein stated represented within "a few feet" the land 
which he was "buying" from Mrs. Sandberg appears graphically 
as fol lmrn : 
Annexation Plat 
(Entirety of Section 
22 annexed to City 
of St. George, except 
portion in City of 
Washfngton.) 
Section 22 
City of Washington 
:Sxcept for a "few feet", there was apparently no re3ervation 
of land for Mrs. Sandberg. The difference between the de-
scription ~n the a~nexation plat and the description on 
the contract, however, is more than the "few feet" indicated 
by th= letter. The distance between the fence line on the 
real estate contract and the east section line of Section 22 
-:59-
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is approximately 1/4 mile. As a result, the ultimate area 
covered by the proferred contract is at least 70 acres less 
than that land annexed to the City of St. George which 
Klein stated he intended to buy on March 30, 1971. 
It is not possible 
to graphically represent the 
fence and area reserved as 
described by the original 
Option Agreement, but the 
area possibly excepted was 
specifically limited to the 
NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22 
which is approximately 40 
acres. The reservoir pre-
Option Agreeffient 
NEl/4 Sec. 22 
Section 22 
sumably would lie to the south anc1 northeast of a fence 
located in th2t area. 
The description of the fence on the Earnest Money 
Earnest Money Receipt 
-60-
Receipt likewise cannot be 
graphically represented. The 
reservoir therein is specific-
ally located, however, in the 
NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22 
and the area subject to pos-
sible reservation is described 
as the entirety of Section 22, 
totalling approximately 640 
acres. 
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Beyond the aforementioned ambiguity and uncertainty 
in the Earnest ~1oney Receipt, Option Agreement and letter 
with accompanying plat, there is a clear contradiction 
betwe.e~ the description on the Option Agreement and the de-
scription on the real estate purchase contract presented by 
Klein for Mrs. Sandberg's signature in 1972. The Option Agree-
ment specifically excludes some lands from its purview, 
but limits those lands to an area within the NE 1/4 
NE 1/4 of Section 22 unless the parties mutually agree to an 
exercise as to part of the land subject to the Option Agree-
ment. The contract, however, reserves land in both the NE 
1/4 NE 1/4 and in the SE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22 to the 
appellants and clearly, requests an exercise as to only a 
portion of land subject to the Option Agreement. 
Option Agreement 
~---------
Section 22 Section 22 
Obviously, Klein has selected only a part of land 
cove~ed by the Option Agreement, which, like any selection 
requires the mutual agreement of the parties. To grant 
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specific performance to the respondent on these facts and to 
blithely find the descriptions in conformity flies in the 
face of the facts, demeans the requirement of descriptive 
conformity of the documents, and allows Klein to unilaterally 
select lands for purchase oblivious to the contractual limi-
tations of the Option Agreement. 
Thus the several land descriptions on the Earnest 
Mondy Agreement, the Option Agreement, the Annexation Plat 
and the real estate purchase contract are at variance with 
each other and actually contradictory. To sustain the lower 
court's holding that they are in conformity would require 
this Court to close its eyes to the several descriptions in 
the record. Appellant invites this Court's scrutiny of those 
descriptions both as written and as platted in the record, a~d 
strenuously urges the Court to find that the contract presented 
for specific performance in excepting lands from the SE 1/4 
NE 1/4 of Section 22 is not in conformity to the plain 
language of the Option Agreement unless the exercise was as 
to only a smaller tract, and clearly excludes lands annexed 
to St. George that on March 30, 1971, Klein indicated he was 
purchasing in his letter of "exercise". 
Finally, it s~ould be noted that there is no evi-
dence that the fence line surveyed at Klein's instance is the 
fence mentioned in the Earnest Money Receipt and Option 
Agreement. Klein, in his letter of March 30, 1971, stated 
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that he had some questions of interpretation, as to what 
Wayne Sandberg, then deceased, wanted to do, and that he 
appreciated Mrs. Sandberg's concern that the fence be 
agreed to by both parties. It never was. 
Ascertainment of Way.1e··Sa.1dberg' s intent will be 
impossible at this date. He is deceased and Klein, the other 
party to negotiations regarding the location of the fence 
line, is incompetent to testify as to those transactions. 
Utah Code Ann. 78-2tf-2(3). 
Further, there is no evidence of an agreement be-
tween Klein and Mrs. Sandberg as to where the fence line is 
located. In fact, the surveyor testified that the fence line 
as surveyed was indicated to him by Klein alone. 
Not only is it evident that no clear and certain 
agreement was reached on the land area to be conveyed, it is 
also facially apparent that Klein himself has not been con-
sistent in requesting one p_iece of land over another. Thus, 
there is not only no sufficient certainty in the several 
descriptions to allow a decree of specific performance, but 
the several descriptions themselves are both ambiguous and, 
in futile attempts at certainty, clearly contradictory. 
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PART THREE - THE OPTION \~AS NOT PROPERLY EXERCISED 
POINT VII 
AS RESPONDENT DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE OPTION 
NO CONTRACT HAS ARISEN 
a. Re~pond_ent Klein Has the Bt:rden_Q_f__Sho~vin__g_J)_t_ri~_Compli­
ance with the Terms-of the Option as Cor.s truec Ago.inst Him. 
Under Utah law an optionee seeking specific perform-
ance bears the burden of showing that he has strictly complied ' 
with all the terffis of the option. Lincoln Land & Development 
Co., v. Thom__p_~o~. 26 Utah 2d 324, 489 P.2d 426 (1971). 
Strict compliance is required because an option creates a 
standing offer on specified terms which may not be withdravm 
and is wholly for the benefit of the buyer. Thompson On Real 
Property, §44Ld, p.258. ~rd Lumber & Investment Co., ·;r. 
Construction Products Corp., 255 P.2d 473 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1953), states the rationale in these terms: 
Since the optionor is bound while the optionee 
is free to accept or notas he chooses, courts 
are strict in holding an optionee to exact 
compliance with the terms of the option. 
(255 P.2d at 478) 
The law does not place a duty upon the optionor to 
help the option~e tender a prorer acceotance. 
We find no rule of law to the effect chat the 
optionee, by serving on optionor an inadequate 
notice of election to exercise the option, 
casts on the optionor any duty to instruct or 
inform the optionee of the particulars in 
which the election to exercise the option 
fails to meet the terms and conditio~s thereof; 
nor do we find that under such circumstances 
-64-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the optionor is required to take any affirmative 
action on the theory that the optionee will 
amend or correct an inadequate acceptance. 
(Koplin v. Bennett, 155 So.2d 568, 573 (Fla. 
App. 1963)) 
Further, where uncertainty or ambiguity appears 
in an option contract, such uncertainty or ambiguity is to 
be construed against the party drawing the instrunent. Jen-
sen v. Anderson, 24 Utah 2d 191, 468 P.2d 366 (1970). Under 
oath, Klein has already admitted that the Option Agreement 
was drawn and prepared by him. (AnRK No. 14, R. 69) There·· 
fore, Klein has the burden of showing strict compliance with 
the terms of the option, as construed against him. 
b. The Purported Exercise o:' the Option Agreement Was 
Improper As To For@. 
An option like any other offer, may only.be accept-
ed on the terms set forth therein. For example, in Nance v. 
Schoonover, 521 P.2d 896 (Utah ·1974), the option under con-
si.deration required payment of $17,000.00 in cash as part 
of the condition for its exercise. This Court held that 
the tender of a personal check in the amount of $17,000.00 
by the optionee did not comply with the terms of the option 
and therefore the attempted exerci.se was fatally defective. 
See also, Lincoln Land Development v. Thompson, 26 Utah 2d 
324, 298 P.2d 426 (1971); Coombs v. Ouzunian, 24 Utah 2d 
39, 77 P.2d 356 (1970); Chournos v. Evona Investment Co., 
~7 U~ah 35, 94 P.2d 470 (1939); Tilton v. Sterling Coal & 
Coke Co., 28 Utah 173, 77 P. 758 (1904) 
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Paragraph 5 of the Option Argreement specifically 
required that the option be exercised by the preparation 
and submission of a real estate contract. 
5. The Buyer may exercise his right to purchase 
this property for the sum of Two Hundred Dollars 
($200.00) per acre at any time during the option 
period, (including any extension period) by exec-
uting a contract to purchase all or such part or 
parts of the property as the parties may agree; 
such contract to purchase shall provide as fol-
lows . . . (R. 61) 
Subparagraphs (a) through (h) which follow state the terms and 
conditions that are to be included or agreed to in the contract 
to purchase. The terms and conditions, inter alia, include: 
1. Payments made during the option period would 
apply to the total purchase price (subparagraph 
(a)) . 
2. Provision for dovm payment of $2,000.00 or such 
other sum as the parties might agree upon and the 
further provision that the total payments made 
during the first ye2r in which the option was 
exercised was not to 29% of the total purchase 
price (subparagraph b)). 
3. Contract period not to exceed ten years (sub-
paragraph (c)). 
4. Payment of the remaining balance in ten annual 
installments and provision for 3% interest on the 
balance (subparagraph (d)). 
5. Contiguous partial releases or as otherwise 
mutually agreed (subparagraph (e)). 
6. Default provisions applicable to both the 
option itself and the land purchase contract 
(subparagraph (f)). 
7. Provision for drilling for water (subparagraph 
(g)) . 
8. Provisions for abstract of t:Ltle (subparagraph 
(h)). 
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It should be noted that the down payment referred 
to in subparagraph b is technically a term and condition of 
the purchase contract, and that the contract, not the pay-
ment, would exercise the option. Further, the total purchase 
price is not stated due to the fact that it is to be determin-
ed by multiplying $200.00 by the number of acres agreed upon 
by both parties ([contract for] "all or such part or parts 
of the property as the parties may agree"). 
To exercise the option, Klein was required to 
execute and submit a purchase contract prior to the expir-
ation of the option. The terms of ti1at con~ract are partially 
set forth in the Option Agreement and partially to be agreed 
upon. Klein's failure to execute a real estate contract 
on or before June 14, 1971, though tendering the down pay-
ment contemplated thereunder, was a fatally defective 
attempt to exercise the option. For example, in Cillessen 
v. Kona Company, 73 N.M. 297, 387 P.2d 867 (1964), plain-
tiffs had tendered monies required as part payment on the 
exercise of an option for real estate, which monies had 
been accepted by the optionor. Despite plaintiffs' claims 
that such part performance rendered the option enforceable, 
the New Mexico Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' specific 
performance on the basis that they had failed to strictly 
comply with the terms of the option which specifically 
iequired them to notify the optionor of their exercise in 
writing. 
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Respondent Klein admits that no contract to purchase 
land included in the option agreement was executed or submitted 
by him prior to June 15, 19 71. (AnRK Nos. 10 and 11, R. 68) 
Clearly in June of 1971, the Option Agreement had not been 
exercised. The lower court's holding that the letter of March 
30, 1971, and tender of $2,000.00 in June of that same year 
constitutes the exercise of the option both is oblivious to 
and ignores the clear requirements of the Option Agreement. 
The court may have relied on the language in many cases stating 
that! "notice of exercise" is all that is required. However, 
those cases all involve options which do not specify submis-
sion of a contract as the meaas of exercise. Where the option 
merely requires notice to exercise,notice is sufficient, but 
where the option calls for submission of a contract to effect 
an exercise, that mode limits the means of exercising the 
power. 
c. The "Exercising Documents" Were On Their Face Preliminary 
To The Exercise Of The Option. 
It is a well established rule of law in Utah that 
an option is a contin"J.ing offer which must be unconditionally 
and unequivocally accepted. Cummings v. England, 12 Utah 
2d 69, 362 P.2d 584 (1961); Williams v. Espey, 11 Utah 2d I 
317, 358 P.2d 903 (1961); Tilton v. Sterling Coal and Coke Co., 
28 Utah 173, 77 P. 758 (1904). Breen v. Mayne, 118 N.W. 
440 (Iowa) states that rule as follows: 
It will not do to establish a rule in these 
cases which will allow an optionee to play 
fast and loose as interest may dictate. The 
acceptance of the option on the election when 
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made, must be unqualified and unequivocal, must 
be to the party giving the option in no uncertain 
manner, and be such that after it is exercised 
it becomes binding upon the party exercising ... 
(118 N.W. at 441). 
In Un.ited States Gypsum Co. v. Mackey Wallplaster Co., 252 F. 
397 (9th Cir. 1918), an optionee was required to give 
written notice two months in advan~e to terminate an option 
to purchase, which would otherwise bind him. The optionee 
wrote the following letter within the requisite time period: 
Dear Sir: On May 5th our option to purchase 
your mill property at Great Falls expires. I 
am writing you in advance of that date to inform 
you that conditions in Montana at this time are 
such that it will be necessary for us to cancel 
our arrangement with you at the time of its ex-
piration, which is July 5th. We have had men 
looking for gypsum almost constantly since our 
last meeting, and so far our efforts have been 
fruitless. If you care to come down and talk 
the matter over, we will be glad to do so. 
Expect to give you formal notice on May 5th 
that we do not care to purchase your property. 
(252 F. at 400). 
The Mackey Court determined that inspite of the letter's 
earlier sta::ement "I am writing you in advance ... to inform 
you ... that it will be necessary for us to cancel our 
arrangement at the time of expiration . . II the 
inclusion of the last sentence in the letter, "[e]xpect 
to give you formal notice on May 5th that we do not care 
to purchase your property" qualified the entire letter, 
rendering it merely precatory and insufficient as notice 
required ~o terminate the option. In so holding, the Mackey 
Court concluded: 
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(E]vidently the writer of the letter well under-
stood the necessity for formal notice as required 
by the terms of the agreement, and was careful not 
to give such a notice, which, of course, would 
have been of binding force. (Id. at 400) 
Not unlike Mackey, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in Shellhart v. 
Axford, 485 P.2d 1031 (Wyo. 1971) confronted a situation 
where written notice was required to exercise an option. In 
Shellhart, a letter from the optionee's attorney stated in 
pertinent part: 
This letter shall constitute that notice, how-
ever, the actual exercise of the option will 
not occur until sometime before December 1, 
1969. (485 P.2d at 1033.) 
The Shellhart Court heid that this was an ineffectual attempt 
to exercise the option, the letter's precatory language not 
binding the optionee to perform. In the instant case, respon-
dent Robert Klein successfully advanced the proposition that 
his letter of March 30, 1971, to Wanda Sandberg along with 
a tender of $2,000.00 constituted the exercise of the 
option. An analysis of the letter, however, shows that it was 
only preliminary to the exercise of the option. In the very 
first paragraph of the subject letter, Klein states: 
[T)here are one or two matters that should be 
considered preparatory to my exercising the 
option and the delivery of title to a portion of 
the land designated by the option. (R. 71) 
Thus, the facially apparent pu~pose of the letter is to present 
and propose matters preparatory to the exercise of the option. 
This paragraph sets the tenor of the letter. The succeeding 
paragraphs further evince that the purpose of the letter is 
to resolve certain matters preparatory to the exercise of the 
option. 
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Respondent's purported exercise of the option is 
apparently based upon the statement contained in the first 
full paragraph on the second page of the subject letter 
(R. 7~) which recites that on or before June 15, 1971, total 
option payments of $18,000.00 will have been tendered, 
which, along with a tender of $2,000.00 to exercise the 
option would allow for the release of 55 acres to the 
optionee pursuant to a formula contained in paragraph 5(e) 
of the Option Agreement. It should be noted that Klein 
has admitted under oath that the total payments made under 
the Option Agreement were only $17,000.00. (See ARK ~12, 
R. 339, AnRK No.l R. 66-67) Respondent, therefore was 
apparently anticipating not only a $2,000.00 down payment 
but also an additional payment of $1,000.00 to extend the 
option and therefore included that amount in his calculation. 
The additional $1,000.00 was never tendered. The letter 
also speaks of a release of 55 acres of land. Application 
of the Option Agreement's formula to determine the number 
of acres which could have been released to Klein had a 
proper exercise occurred reveals that on the basis of actual 
payments tendered as of the purported exercise in June of 
1971, Klein could have demanded release of only 52.5 acres. 
That the letter speaks of necessary future events and 
assumes their occurrence as of the date of the exercise 
indicates t~at the letter was preliminary. 
That the letter is both precatory and preparatory 
in nature is further evinced by its enumeration of matters 
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Klein expects to be accomplished prior to the exercise of 
the option. For example, the penultimate paragraph on page 
2 of the letter states as follows: 
During the months of April and May of 1971 I think 
we should try to accomplish the following: 
1. Have survey made to determine the exact amount 
of acreage to be sold. 
2. Arrive at the exact selling price so as to be 
be able to determine the exact amount of prin-
cipal that will be due and payable during a 
period of 10 annual installments. 
3. Prepare a land purchase agreement consistant 
[sic] with the terms of an option agreement 
and the accepted number of acres involved 
consistant [sic] with the survey that will 
have previously been prepared. (R. 72 (em-
phasis added)) 
That Klein knew that the letter could not be a valid exercise 
is conclusively shown by his statement that a land purchase 
agreement needed to be prepared consistent with the terms of 
the Option Agreement. Klein knew what was required to properly 
exercise the option if, in fact, he so elected. Construing 
the letter, however, as a whole, it is apparent that it is 
nothing more than a statement of intent and of matters to 
be accomplished befor~ exercising the option and in no way 
binds defendant Robert Klein to purchase the property. 
(Note, that letter is unsigned in the record before the Court.) 
In Sieverts v. White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P.2d 974 (1954), the 
Utah Supreme Court held that a statement that a party intends 
to do something is not the same thi.ng as doing it. This is 
clearly a foundation of option law, which requires strict 
compliance from the party seeking specific performance. 
Analytically, the letter cannot bear the burden of the op-
tion's exercise and simply does not establish the requisite 
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mutuality to bind the optionee. See POINT VIII, infra. 
As this letter is clearly not the unequivocal, 
unconditional acceptance of an option required by Utah law, 
it in no way binds Klein to any type of performance. Fur-
ther, not only has there been no evidence that Wanda Sand-
berg accepted the letter as the exercise of the option, it 
was stipulated as fact that at no time did she waive the 
proper tender of a contract as the exercise of the option. 
(AWS, R. 355; T. 6:29-7:3, R. 399) 
d. The Tender of The Real Estate Contract in June of 1972 
Was Not Timely_. 
An option, as previously stated, is a continuing 
offer which must be unconditionally accepted. Cummings v. 
England, 12 Utah 2d 69, 362 P.2d 584 (1961); Williams v. Espey, 
11 Utah 2d 317, 358 P.2d 903 (1961); R.J. Dallm Const. Co. v. 
Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 3'17 (1952). Specifically, 
the exercise of an option must be made in the manner pre-
scribed by law or specified in the option agreement. Time-
liness of the exercise is material and has been said to be 
the essence of the option whether or not the option so states. 
For example, in Kelsey v. Crowther, 7 Utah 519, 27 P. 695 
(1891), the Utah Supreme Court stated that an option period 
of 30 days did not mean 31 days and plaintiffs having 
failed to exercise the option in the 30 days lost their 
right to enforce the option. Likewise, in Gibbs v. Morgan, 
101 Utah 66, 118 P.2d 128 (1941), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that since an option had not been exercised within the 
90-day period 8iven thereunder, it could not be gpecifically 
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enforced. In a recent case, Wulfenstein v. Larson, 527 P.2d 
650 (Utah 1974), the Utah Supreme Court dealt with an option 
agreement that required written notice of its exercise. 
The optionors did not actually come into possession of the 
notice until six days after the expiration date, though the 
notice had been mailed two days prior to the expiration date 
of the option. The postal service was not able to deliver 
it at that time and had tir:iely left a "notice of attempted 
delivery" at the address. Six days later the defendants 
picked up the letter at the post office. The Court held, 
that, under these circumstances, the requirement of notice r,ad 
been timely given. 6 
In the instant case execution and submission of a 
real estate purchase contract was specifically required 
to exercise the option. The maximum period of duration of 
the Option Agreement was approximately 18 years from the 
date of the signing of the option which was September 21, 
1964. (R. 59, 60) The continuing validity of the option, 
however, was conditioned upon making certain payments. 
Paragraph 3 of the Option Agreement provides as follows: 
3. The follo'lving payments as rr.ade and as to be 
made shall be required to keep their option in 
good standing: 
6The decision may have been based on the 'mailbox rule' 
whi~h states that the time of acceptance is when the letter 
delivered over to the post office or the Court may have 
felt that the letter was constructivelv received by the optionr· 
before expiration of the option. ~1atever the grounds it is 
apparent that timeliness was crucial and that there were 
adequate grounds for finding the exercise timely. 
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a. Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) on June 
14, 1962, receipt of which is herebv acknow-
ledged as the original consideration for the 
option. 
b. Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00) on Decem-
ber 14, 1962, receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged. 
c. One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) on June 
14, 1963, receipt of which is hereby acknow-
ledged, and 
d. The sum of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) 
on June 14, 1963, and the sum of One Thousand 
Dollars ($1,000.00) each six (6) months thereafter 
(i.e. each December 14 and June 14) until the 
option is exercised or until the expiration of 
the option period, unless the purchase price is 
sooner paid in full." (R. 60(emµhasis added)). 
Summarizing $1,000.00 was to be paid each six (6) 
months on or before December 14, and on or before June 14 to 
maintain the option in good standing for the next ~uceeding 
six months. The use of the term "shall be" in p.Hagraµh 3 makes 
such payments mandatory to keep the option in effect. Respondent 
Klein has already admitted his failure to tender $1,000.00 on 
June 14, 1971, which caused the Option Agreement to expire on 
that date, his last payment to extend the option being made on 
or before December 14, 1970. (AnRK Nos. 1,4,7,9, & 13, R.66-69). 
It is hornbook law that con:>ideration tendered 
to maintain the option in good standing is separate and 
distinct from consideration given under the contract formed 
, when the option is exercised. Ide v. Leiser, 10 Mont. 5, 
24 P. 695 (!8981, see also, 77 Am.Jur. Vender and Purchaser 
~34 (1975). Thus respondent cannot assert that the pay-
ment of $2,000.00 tendered on June 3, 1971, bearing 
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the notation "doi;..111 payment to co11U11ence June 15 agreement 1971" 
was intended or accepted as payment to extend the option. 
In fact, respondent Klein has never so contended. (AnRK Nos. 
1, 4, 7, 9 and J.3, R. 66-69) 
Appellants contend that under Utah law, Klein was 
required to present a contract of purchase executed by 
him as grantee while the option was still in good standing. 
Mrs. Sandberg never waived this requirement, such fact 
being stipulated to by both parties. (AWS, R. 355; T. 6: 29-
7: 3, R. 399) As the last payment to maintain the option 
in good standing was made on December 14, 1970, an exercise 
must have occurred prior to June 14, 1971 to be timely. 
Thus, the presentation of an executed contract on May 16, 
1972, more than eleven months after the expiration of the 
option is a defective exercise. Under Utah law timeliness 
is material. The respondent Klein contends that timeliness 
is excused because of the difficulty encountered in com-
pleting the terms of the purchase contract, specifically 
the description of lands to be included thereunder and 
the purchase price to be determined from the total acreage 
thereof. The Option Agreement, however, had been in effect 
in one form or another for over nine years when it expired, 
and it expressly provided that any expenses incurred by Klein 
could be applied against the purchase price. There was no 
excuse for Klein's delay. Any "agreement" to the contrary 
is parol and extraneous to the Option Agreement and would 
materially alter it, and again Klein has already stipulated 
that at no time did Mrs. Sandberg request him to refrain 
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from submitting contracts as required under the Option 
Agreement. (AWS n, R. 355; T. 6:29-7:3, R. 399) 
e. The "Exercising" Documents Were in Fact a Counteroffer. 
It is a basic principle of contract law that an 
offer must be accepted on the terms on which it was made; 
any alteration of such offer is tantamount to rejection of 
the original offer and the making of a counteroffer. 91 
C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser §10 (1975) Similarly, this 
principle of contract law is applicable to options. For 
example, in ~ard Lumber & Investment Co. v. Construction 
Products C~, 255 P.2d 473 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953) 
a lessor of real property and machinery granted his lessee 
an option to renew the lease for a period of two years. Inunedi-
ately prior to the expiration of the option, the lessee wrote 
the lessor a letter, the material part of which reads as 
follows: 
We are continuing our lease in accordance 
with our lease contract for the year 1951 for 
the factory and the machinery and tools. 
255 P.2d at 475. 
Because the lessee attempted to renew the option for only a 
one-year period instead of two, the lessor notified the lessee 
that the lessee had failed to properly exercise the option 
to renew the lease provision of the agreement. The California 
Appellate Court, ruling on the lessor's objection, held as 
The determination that defendant's attempt-
ed exercised of the option was not in accordance 
with the agreement is consistent with the settled 
principle, 'applicable to options as to other 
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contracts, that the offer must be accepted 
in the terms in which it is made, and the 
alteration of such terms ... is tantamount to 
a rejection of the original offer and the 
making of a counter-offer.' (Id. at 466-467 
(citations omitted)). 
The Ha~_Q Court further stated, 
To avail himself of an option of renewal 
given cy a lease, a tenant must apprise the 
lessor in unequivocal terms of his unqual-
ified intention to exercise his option in the 
precise terms permitted by the lease. 32 
Am.Jur, Sec. 979 p.822. . In the matter 
at bar, however, a judgment against defen-
dant was based upon its failure to exercise 
the option as required by its particular 
terms. An optjon is an offer by which a 
promisor binds himself in advance to make 
a contract if the optionee accepts upon 
the rerms and within the time designated 
in the option. Since th~_QEtioner is bou~_s! 
while the optionee Tstree to accep_! or not 
as he chooses, courts are strict in holding 
an opt io:1ee to exact C0.'.!1£ liance v. i tb the terms 
of the_ont~on. Wightman v. Hall, 7-17 Pac. 
58Q1T9 2~ By varying the terms of the 
option in his purported renewal, defendant 
in effect rejected the option which became 
extinguished with the expiration of the terms 
of the lease. (Id. at 477-478(emphasis added)) 
This rule is also the law in Utah. For example, in 
Tilton v. Sterling Coal and Coke Co., et. al., 28 Utah 173, 
77 P. 758 (1904), the Utah Supreme Court stated that an option 
granted in a lease was not accepted, because the optionee re-
quired, as a condition of his acceptance, that the optioner do 
more than called for by the lease, in effect attempting to ex-
pand the nature of the optionor's performance. Noting that 
conditional acceptance of an option amounts to a practical 
rejection of it, the Utah Supreme Court further quoted an 
early treatise which states the rule as follows: "The 
respondent is at liberty to accept wholly or to reject 
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wholly; but one of these things he must do, for if he answers, 
not rejec~ing, but proposing to accept under some modifications, 
this is a rejection of the offer." 28 Utah at 179. Similarly, 
in Cho~rnos v. Evona Inv. Co., 97 Utah 335, 94 P.2d 470 (1939), 
an option provided two individuals as joint lessees a first 
right of refusal should the lessor receive an offer to purchase 
the leased property. The son of one of the joint lessees 
subsequently offered to purchase the property. Chournos, the 
other joint lessee, appeared at the lessor's office and 
tendered the required purchase price and requested a deed for 
himself. He was advised that this could not be done. He 
then tendered one-half of the purchase price and requested a 
deed to one-half of the property. He was again advised that 
this could not be done. The conversation proceeded ~nd the 
time rolled past 12:00 o'clock, the deadline for exercising 
the option. The lessor then advised Chournos that all ten-
ders were off as the deadline had passed. The Utah Supreme 
Court held that both the request that a deed be made to 
Chournos only and not to Chournos and the other joint 
lessee and the subsequent tender of one-half of the price 
and request for one·-half of the property amounted to rejections 
of the offer and the making of a counteroffer. 
The letter of March 30, 1971, from Defendant Klein 
to Mrs. Sandberg, was held by the lower court to constitute, 
(t~6e~~er with a check for $2,000.00 delivered and paid on 
June 3, 1971,) the exercise of the option. (Order, ,7, 
R. 358) The letter itself, however, not only is precatory 
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in nature but further proposes that an annexation description 
corresponding only "within a few feet" of the Option Agree-
rnent' s description be purchased and that Mrs. Sandberg par-
ticipate in the cost of a survey, even though paragraph Sh 
of the Option Agreement provides that such costs may be 
applied by respondent against the contract purchase price. 
(R. 71- 73, see also POINT VI, supra; R. 63) As such, the 
letter is not only precatory in nature, but constitues a 
counteroffer to the original Option Agreement. 
Bv merely changing the legal description of the 
property in the purported exercise of the option, and pro-
posing additional obligations for Mrs. Sandberg, respondent 
Klein rejected the original offer, and extended a counter-
offer. Clearly, this is not an exercise of the option since 
it varied from its preferred terms. It is telling that 
although the lower court found many cf the terms of the 
letter binding as against Mrs. Sandberg and further found 
the letter to properly express the understanding of the 
parties, it did not assess half of the costs of Mr. Stevens' 
survey, subsequently requested by Klein, against her. 
(Order, ~7. R. 358) 
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POINT VIII 
THE LACK OF MUTUALITY BELIES THE CREATION 
OF AN AGREEMEHT BY THE LETTER OF MARCH 30, 1971, 
AND THE TENDERED CHECK OF JUNE 1971 
Respondent Klein, and the lower court felt that th2 
March 30, 1971, letter and the $2,000.00 check constituted 
an exercise of the Option Agreement and that an enforceable 
contract was made between the parties. The lack of mutuality 
belies the creation of a contract between the parties. Their 
lack of mutuality is due to the vagueness of the exercising 
documents and particularly to the existence of ambiguities in 
the Option Agreement, and "exercising letter". 
In contrast to the land selection provision of the 
Option Agreement which required a future agreement in all 
circumstances, two other clauses in the Option Agreement 
require a future agreement though only in the alternative. 
For example, paragraph 5 (e) provides for release of land upon 
selection by the Buyer of contiguous parcels or upon agreement 
of the parties if non-contiguous releases are sought. It states 
as follows: 
Land to be released shall be selected by the 
Buyer provided such land is contiguously selec-
ted or otherwise mutually agreed to by both 
parties. (R.62) 
Another provision for future mutual agreement as an 
alternative to specified terms is found in paragraph S(b) regard-
ing the down payment on the contract contemplated by the option. 
That paragraph states as follows: 
The Buyer shall pay a down payment of Two Thousand 
Dollars ($2,000.00) (or such other amount as the 
parties may agree) on said contract. . . . (R. 61) 
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Again this drafting clearly provides for future mutual agree-
ment as an alternative to a specified payment of $2,000.00 
and thus, it is not comparable to the land selection provision 
either in structure nor in intent. 
While otherwise specific provisions requiring the 
necessity of future agreement only in the alternative would 
seemingly not require a contract to be declared uneforceable 
unless that alternative were invoked, some courts have 
indicated that the mere existence of such an alternative ren-
ders such a written instrument unforceable as clearly lacking 
the requisite mutuality of obligation. Simply stated these 
courts find that where an alternative exists requiring future 
mutual agreement the written instrument is unenforceable. 
For example, the Kline v. Rogerson decision, supra, 
found a contract fatally deficient when it provided for annual 
payments of $5,000.00 per year or in an amount agreed to by 
the parties. When the buyer refused to pay $5, 000. 00 per year, 
but was willing to pay $2, 000. 00 per year, the court found 
that the seller could not compel the buyer to pay $5,000.00 
per year and found the contract uneforceable. 
In Utah it has been held that an unconditional accept-
ance of an offer specifying payment in a lump sum, or alterna- '1 
tively, on installments does not create an enforceable agreemen: 
For example, in Candland v. Oldroyd, 67 Utah 605, 248 P. 1101 
(1926), the Utah Supreme Court considered whetl1er an enforceable 
contract had arisen from an unconditional acceptance of an 
offer to sell land for $1,300.00 in cash or for $1,400.00 on 
terms specifically set forth. The buyer's accep•:ance failed t 1' 
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indicate whether the acceptance applied to the cash offer or 
the offer stated in terms. On the basis of the written 
documents, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
How could Oldroyd [Seller], or how could anyone, 
determine that Candland accepted to buy for cash 
or that he proposed to buy on payments to be 
made at stated times? How could Oldroyd determine, 
on receipt of Candland's communication ... 
whether he had sold his farm for cash or on time? 
We do not see how it can be said with any degree 
of certainty from the writings--and the rights of 
these parties must be determined from these 
writings--that the minds of the parties ever met 
on a sale for $1,300 in cash or on a sale $1,400 
on time. There is nothing in the letter of respondent 
Candland, sc.ve the statemen:: that he accepts "your 
proposition" indicating which of the offers he had 
accepted. (248 P. at 1102) 
In Candland, the Utah Supreme Court succinctly stated 
the doctrine of mutuality of obligation as it relates to the 
remedy of specific performance. 
Let us assume that Candland had refused to go 
forward and nurchase the uropertv, and that 
Oldroyd had instituted an-aciian· for suecific 
performance and had alleged that the offer had 
been made and acc·epted in the language found in 
the letters. Upon what theory could he have 
enforced specific performance? Would it have 
been upon the theory that Candland was to buy 
for cash or upon time? Whatever right Oldroyd 
had in an action of that nature must and would 
have been adjudged and determin2d from the writ-
ing found in the two letters. In what way could 
he have proven that respondent had elected to 
contract either for a cash payment or on time? 
A contract to be binding upon one must likewise 
be binding upon the other. If one party has a 
right to insist upon specific performance, the 
other party to the contract must likewise have 
the same right. Tested by the elementary consid-
erations that enter into every contract, we are 
unable to conclude that any contract existed 
growing out of this correspondence (248 P. 1103) 
-83-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the instant case, the lower court held that by 
the letter dated March 30, 1971, with the tender of $2,000.00 
respondent Klein had exercised the Option Agreement and was 
entitled to specific performance thereon. If the letter and 
the check represent the acceptance of the Option Ag~eement, 
giving rise to a contract between the parties, then as of the 
date of Klein's "acceptance" both Kleir. and Mrs. Sandberg must 
have had enforceable obligations. If there was a contract, 
there would have been mutuality of obligation. The salient 
question is, what would a court have found had Mrs. Sandberg 
sued, allegin~ the Option Agreement and the letter and check 
as a contract against Klein? Obviously, the proof of a 
contract would be deficient.as the letter is ambivalent, 
contradicts t~e Option Agreement, requests additional terms, 
proposes future agreement, is an unintegrated document, and 
is unsigned in the record before the Court. Likewise, in a 
suit by Klein, the proof is deficient. 
Considering the issue of mutuality of obligation 
let us again examine the letter of March 30, 1971. It should 
first be noted that there is no evidence in the record that the ' 
March 30, 1971, letter was ever signed by Klein. Therefore, 
that document could not have been relied upon by Mrs. Sandberg 
in a claim against Klein. That letter, according to Mr. Klein, 
represents his acceptance of the Option Agreement. However, 
bearing no signature as it appears in the file, it could not 
have been relied on as an acceptance or exercise by Mrs. 
Sandberg in an action against the respondent. Further, the 
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letter refers to three enclosures, only one of which, the 
annexation plat (as ratified in May of 1971 by the St. George 
City Council), is in the file. Thus, it also is an unintegrated 
docum<::nt. While Klein has subsequently executed other documents 
upon which he could be charged, none of those documents came 
into existence until after the expiration of the option and are 
untimely. There was, therefore, no mutuality of contract within 
the option period. 
The terms of the letter are so equivocal as to 
prevent any enforcement by Mrs. Sandberg. Not only does the 
first paragraph fail to indicate a present exercise of the 
option, it specifically speaks in precatory terms regarding 
preparations necessary to the contemplated exercise of the 
Option Agreement in the future. 
The second, third, fourth and fifth paragraphs of the 
letter discussed supra in Points Vb, VI, VIIc further indicate 
Klein's understanding that the property to be sold needed to 
be agreed to and that it had not on March 30, 1971, been des-
cribed to the satisfaction of either party. In fact in para-
graph 5 of that letter defendant Klein states as follows: 
Should you still have some apprehension that I 
am not aware of, I am sure that on a face to 
face basis and with the help of a surveyor we 
can resolve fairly to each of our satisfaction 
whatever diffenences [sic] of opinion we may 
encounter. 
It is tellin8 that over a year later, respondent's attorney 
indicated that the property description still had not been 
fully resolved. (R.115) 
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The trial court's finding that the March 30, 1971 
letter along with the $2,000.00 check bearing the notation 
"down payment on June 15, agreement 1971 was an unequivocal 
and clear exercise of the Option Agreement flies in the face of 
the physical facts of this case and it cannot be said that 
Wanda Sandberg could have bound Klein to purchase anything on 
the basis of that letter and that tender of $2,000.00, because 
on June 15, 1971, there was no memorandum sufficient on which 
to seek specific performance against Klein. Simply stated, 
the letter is vague, ambivalent, and contradictory. Unsigned 
in the record before the Court, it is also unintegrated, two 
of the referenced documents therein not in the record, or in the 
appellants' possession. Further, the letter proposes future 
agreement and seeks to impose additional terms on Mrs. Sandberg. 
PART FOUR - SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT OF THE REAL ESTATE 
CONTRACT WAS IMPROPER 
POINT IX 
RESPONDENT'S REAL ESTATE. PURCHASE CONTRACT IS NOT 
IN CONFORMITY WITH THE OPTION AGREEMENT 
The lower court decreed specific performance on a real 
estate purchase contract prepared by Klein nearly a year 
after the Option Agreement expired. (Order ~4 & Ill of Conclusionc: 
I 
R. 358). The court may have felt that enforcing a real estate 
contract would at least appear to conform with the terms of the 
option which specifically required the creation of just such 
an instrument. Also, a decree of specific performance on a 
real estate contract is much more expeditious than a decree on 
the Option Agreement as purportedly exercised, with explanato0 
parol documents. Those documents are so vague and uncert.1in 
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that enforcement of a document unsigned by the party to 
be charged, created almost one year after the expiration of 
the option it would p~rport to exercise, was that the real 
estate contract was "in conformity" with the Option Agreement 
in hoth description and consideration. Nothing could be less 
true. (Order'' 4 & 5, R.358). 
a. Land Descriptions on The Real Estate Purchase Contract and 
Option Agreement are Not in Conformity. 
It is undisputed by the parties that the original 
Earnest Money Receipt which preceded the Option Agreement and 
was superseded by it pertained to the following property: 
All land owned by the Sellers in Section, 
21, 22 and 27, Township 42 South, Range 15 
West, S.L.M., consisting, so far as the parties 
can det:ermine at this time of approximately 500 
acres. Not including any water or water ·rights 
and less the following: 
There is now a.reservoir constructed by the 
City of St. George on what the parties believe to 
be the Northeast quarter Northeast quarter of 
Section 22, and there is an old fence running 
north and south west of this reservoir. The 
sellers intend 'to reserve from said sale all land 
in said Section 22 which lies east of said fence 
line, it being understood that the exact line 
will have to be determined if and when the option 
hereinafter mentioned is executed. (R. 196 (emphasis 
added)). 
Two and one-half years after the Earnest Money Receipt was 
signed, the parties replaced it with an Option Agreement, 
drawn and prepared by respondent, that by its terms formally 
set forth the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement together 
i·T:!. th modifications to which the parties had agreed. (AnRK No. 
14, R.69; R.59). The Option Agreement prescribed a certain 
mode of exercising the option therein, said mode being discussed 
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previously and entc:>.iling the execution of a contract of 
purchase for land to be mutually selected from the following 
description: 
[A]ll land owned by the Sellers in Section 21, Sec-
tion 22 and Section 27 of Township 42 South, RanPe 
15 West, Salt Lake Base and ~1eridian, consisting"' 
of approximately 500 acres, which property shall 
be more particularly described in Schedule A 
attached hereto, to be signed by the parties and 
made a part hereof for all purposes; not includinp, 
any water or water rights, and excluding all land 
in the Northeast One Quarter of the Northeast One 
Quarter of Section 22, which lies East of the old 
fence line, which runs North and Southwest of 
the City of St. George reservoir, said excluded 
property also to be more particularly described 
in Schedule A attached hereto and made n oart 
hereof for all purposes. . 
It is clear from the two descriptions set forth 
that the Earnest Money Receipt and the Option Agreement do 
not pertain to the same parcel. (See Point VI, supra). 
Furthermore, the description of the tract to be attached and 
subscribed to the Option Agreement as Exhibit A is nonexistent. 
The lower court can neither create that exhibit for the parties 
nor sign Mrs. San-::iberg's name to it. Certainly, the 'Exhibit 
A' describing the land to be purchased by re3pondent in his 
contract of 1972 does not conform, as that contract excludes 
land in the SE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22 as well as the NE 1/4 
NE 1/4, and certainly does not bear Mrs. Sandberg's signature. 
(R.170). Succintly stated, the Option Agreement is not an 
integrated document. 
The respondent drew and prepared the Option Agreement. 
(AnRK No. 14, R.69). Mrs. Sandberg, on the other hand, was 
not even aware in 1976 what possessing land in fee meant. 
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(DWS 4:30-5:4, R. 398). The nonintegration of the document, 
therefore, should be fatally construed against Klein, the 
drafter, real estate man and developer. 
Although, the letter of March 30, 1971 is incompetent 
evidence to clarify the nature of the nonexistent 'Exhibit A', 
let us assume, arguendo, that that letter provides the means 
for accurately platting the phantom description. After all, 
the lower court considered the letter sufficient along with 
the respondent's payment in June of 1971 to timely exercise the 
option. (Order ~7. R. 358). In referring to a fenceline 
spoken of in the Earnest Money Agreement and the Option Agree-
ment, the letter states as follows: 
My interpreation of the number of acres essentially 
corresponds with yours, namely that the land Wayne 
intended to sell lies west of the fence line that 
you and I have both seen together. I would like 
you to know that I can appre:iate your concern 
that this line be .agreed to by both of us .. 
I walked the fence line the other day and noted that 
it has some irregular jogs in it that you and I 
should probab~y discuss in order to assure abso-
lute clarificatipn. I see no problem in this 
connection as I am as a matter of personal princi-
ple disposed to agree with your wishes. 
If you think about it, descriptions along section 
or quarter section lines generally are more easily 
handled. It is for this reason, after careful re-
view that I have discribed [sic] the annexation 
description as indicated by the plat which I am 
including with this letter. This description with-
in a few feet, corresponds with the fence line 
that you and I have observed together when we 
last saw each other. This I trust will correspond 
with your own interpretation of what land you in 
fact believe vou are selling. Should you still 
have some apprehension that I am not aware of, I 
am sure that on a face to face basis and with the 
help of a surveyor we can resolve fairly to each 
of our satisfaction whatever diffenences [sic] of 
opinion we may encounter. (R. 71-72(emphasis added)). 
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While the Earnest Money Agreement and the Option 
Agreement do not conform in what areas east of a fenceline 
are to be excluded, the former referring to all lands in 
Section 22 east of a fenceline, and the latter only to lanJ 
in the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22 east of a fenceline, the 
letter proposes an enclosed annexation description correspondin: 
only "within a few feet" to "the fence line". Thus, at its 
very best, the enclosed annexation description only approxi-
mated the fenceline descriptions in both the Earnest ~1oney 
Agreement and the Option Agreement as respondent understood the~. 
The last sentence in the letter adds a final touch 
of ambivalence to 1vhat clearly constitutes a counteroffer 
and proposal for agreement. That sentence states as follows: 
You will note that_l__am or:i]y___EI__o_Qosinq that land 
oeannexea 1vhich I am in fact buying from vou. 
(R. 73 (emphasis added")). 
The proposed annexation linen was executed by 
Robert Klein and Wanda Sandberg on April 5, 1971. (ARK HI+ ,R 33'' 
The same linen, bearinr; the notation "Holidaire Lands Inc. 
addition to St. George City" and signed by respondent as 
President of Holidaire Lands Inc. appears in the record on 
page 109 and in the probate record at page 83. (Note, there are 
two sets of 80's in the probate record). Its appearance is 
altered from that of March 30th, 1971, because, as he proposed 
respondent was successful in causing those lands to be 
annexed to the City of St. George and the Exhibits in the 
file bear the city's subsequent approval. (MRK, R. 289). 
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Apparently, to confirm the last sentence of the March 30th 
letter, Klein has, urider oath, stated that that plat dealt 
with the real property that was the subject matter of the 
lawsuit (ARK H4, R. 339), and that "he was buying approxi-
mately 450 acres described in the Holidaire Lands annexation 
plat and the option agreement dated September 21, 1964." 
(Anll4RK 2c, R.151). Though the lower court apparently did 
not take the time to verify whether the Exhibit A to 
respondent's real estate purchase contract (R. 121) corresponded 
to the annexation description, this Court, with its power to 
review the facts in equity cases can, and, indeed, must review 
these Exhibits. And, in reviewing them, this Court will dis-
cover that respondent's real estate purchase contract of 
1972 (R. 117-121) covers approximately seventy (70) acres 
less ground than the annexation. (See Point VI, supral· 
Clearly, respondent sbught to purchase in 1972 less 
ground than was annexed, less than he proposed to buy in 
1971 when the option was still effective, and when the lower 
court ruled he had exercised the option. To allow the 
respondent to play this fast, and this loose, and then to 
allow the discrepancies in the descriptions to go unnoticed 
is to impose the renpondent's ambivalence upon Mrs. Sandberg 
a~d b~y whatever his latest request is, well, that will be 
f . . h 7 ine wit us. 
7As stated, the most serious discrepancy between the 
Option Agreement and the "exercising"letter, and the real 
estate purchase contract is the disparity of the land 
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b. The Real Estate Purchase Contract and the Jption Agreement 
are Not in Conformity as to the Necessity of Future 
Agreement. 
The real estate purchase contract also ignores the 
Option Agreement's clear requirement for the mutual agreement 
of the parties on many terms, the most important of which is 
the amount of land to be subject to any contract of sale 
exercising the option. Though the Option Agreement states 
that it covers a certain amount of land, less a reserved area 
for the optionor, it is clear that the future agreement of 
the parties is required as to the amount of land to be subject 
to any contract of sale. The parties have never agreed to 
the amount of land Klein proposes in the contract. In this 
respect also the contract is not in conformity with the 
Option Agreement. 
descriptions. The argumenc at Point VI, supra, has noted that 
the area reserved for Mrs. Sandberg under the Option Agreement 
was approximately 40 acres in the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 22 
while the area reserved for her under the contract is approx-
imately 70 acres in the NE 1/4 NE 1/4 and in the SE 1/4 NE 1/4 
of Section 22, both of which vary from the annexation plat. 
The two possible reasons for these differences are that Klein 
is proposing an exercise as to only a part of the property 
subject to the Option Agreement or that Klein simply was con-
fused as to the location of fence which defined the boundary 
of the reserved parcel. There is no evidence that the fence 
surveyed by Klein is the fence spoken of in the Earnest Money 
Receipt and Option Agreement. There are some indications that 
it is not the proper fence line. For example, the descriptions 
of the fence in those two documents refer to the fence as being 
north and southwest of a reservoir. The fence Klein platted, 
however, runs straight north and south and could not be both 
north and southwest of any single point. Also, the fence 
referred to in the Option Agreement is only in the NE 1/4 
~E 1/4 of Section 22 while the fence Klein has surveyed is 
~n both the NE 1/4 and SE 1/4 of the NE 1/4 of Section 22. 
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c. The Real Estate Purchase Contract and the Option Agreement 
are not in conformity as to Time Requirements. 
The real estate purchase contract proposes that the 
first annual payment thereunder be made on June 15, 1972. 
The Option Agreement required that the first annual payment under 
any contract of exercise be made one year after the date of the 
contract's execution. The date Klein submitted the real estate 
purchase contract was May 16, 1972. This indicates that the 
payment of the first annual installment is not properly scheduled. 
Assuming, however, that Klein meant by designating the first pay-
ment for June 15, 1972, that there was a contract between the 
parties one year prior to that date (i.e., on .June 15, 1971), 
it is apparent that the supposed prior contract is at least a 
day late, for the option expired, at the latest, at midnight 
on June 14, 1971, when the six month extension paid for on 
December 14, 1970, expired. Even in his attempt to substan-
tiate a fabricated parol c0ntract, Klein is untimely, and 
the real estate purchase cont~act is again not in conformity 
with the Option Agreement. 
d. The Real Estate Purchase Contract and the Option Agreement 
are Not in Conformity as to Manner of Exercise. 
Another discrepancy in the real estate purchase con-
tract is found in the self-serving statements respondent makes 
therein to a purported exercise of the Option Agreement in 
1971. (R.117). For reasons already presented at POINT VII, 
supra, the letter and check of March and June,1971, respec-
tively were not a valid exercise of the Option Agreement. The 
Option Agreement clearly specifies that exercise is to be 
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made by execution of a real estate contract. (R. 61) No other 
documents or action will constitute a valid exercise. The 
real estate purchase contract thus contradicts the clear 
requirement of th~ Option Agreement. 
e. The Real Estate Purchase Contract and the 0 tion A reement 
are Not in Con ormity as to Consideration. 
The real estate purchase contract submitted by 
Klein recites that in addition to the $2,000.00 paid in 
June, 1971, an additional amount of $18,000.00 was paid 
under the Option Agreement and is to be acknowledged by Mrs. 
Sandberg as prior payment toward the total purchase price of 
$86,368.00. (R.118, 1[~ 2,2a & 2b) Paragraph Sa of the Option 
Agreement allowed that all payments made under it, "including 
payments made for and during the extension period, shall apply 
on the contract purchase price." (R.61) Therefore, in the 
real estate purchase contract Klein reduced the total purchase 
price by $18,000.00 purportedly paid to maintain the Option 
Agreement in good standing and by the $2,000.00 down payment 
made in June of 1971. These amounts correspond to the amounts 
Klein, in his letter of March, 1971, believed would be paid 
as of the date of his exercise of the option. Respondent, 
however, has later admitted under oath that he paid only 
$17,000 under the Option Agreement, not including the $2,C'00.00 
in June'. (ARK H2, R. 339; AnRK No. 1_, R.66-67; & MRK ~4, R.270 
Thus, even assuming the description in Exhibit A to the real 
estate purchase contract were somehow correct, and e"ven 
assuming the contract had been timely tendered (both of which 
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assumptions strain even a creative imagination), the consid-
eration recited therein and due Mrs. Sandberg thereunder 
would be and is insufficient'. Succintly, the $86,368.00 
total price recited in the real estate purchase contract minus 
$19,0GG.OG is not equal to $66,368.00 recited as the balance 
remaining due, but rather $67,368.00. 
Clearly, there is no basis for the lower court's 
finding that the real estate purchase contract was in confor-
mity "both as to description and consideration with the 
Option Agreement." (Order 114, R. 358). 
The facts and simple mathematics belie the accuracy 
of the lower court's findings. The decree of specific perfor-
mance on that contract (R. 358, Conclusions ~l) is onerous a~: 
to Mrs. Sandberg because its terms are so different from 
those of the Option Agreemen't which bears her signature. The 
lower court's decree of specific enforcement of a document 
which is insufficient in consideration, proposes unilaterally 
drafted terms, lacks Mrs. Sandberg's agreement as to land 
descriptions, and was conceived by respondent almost one year 
after the option expired,must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellants seek reversal of the summary judgment 
declaring the Option Agreement a valid and enforceable con-
tract and decreeing specific performance of that agreement 
in conformity to a real estate purchase contract submitted 
to the lower court by respondent. 
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Because respondent's claim for relief was bottomed 
in equity and due to the fact that the lower court ruled 
favorably on respondent's motion for summary judgment, this 
Court must consider both the facts and the law in this case, 
must do it without favor to the findings below, and must 
draw inferences in favor of the appellant. Only the applica-
tion of these standards, as established by both statutory and 
case law, will afford the appellant her day in cot:rt. 
The nature of a decree of specific performance requires 
cl.:!ar and certain proof as to all of the material terms of a 
contract, and it is the respondent who bears this burden. 
In the instant case, the document3 presented by respon-
dent as the basis for his claim include an Ear~est Money 
Receipt executed by appellant in 1962 and an Option Agreement 
executed in 1964 that superseded the Earnest Money Receipt. 
Only these documents bear the appellant's signature and under 
the Statute of Frauds she can be charged only with these docu-
ments. Parol evidence, while admissable to clarify such 
writings, cannot be used to add to or subtract from their terms. 
Specifically, the letter dated March 30, 1971 apparently 
drafted by respondent but unsigned by him in the record before 
the Court ~ be admissible to show notice of acceptance of 
the option, if notice were all that was required, but not to 
add to, subtract from, or alter the contractual liability of 
the appellant. 
The OptiJn Agreement before this Court is not a 
document susceptible of specific performance. Dravm and 
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prepared by the respondent, a man experienced in real 
estate matters, it leaves material terms to the future 
agreement of the parties. Paragraph 5 of the Option Agree-
ment, for example, which specifies the manner of the option's 
exercise, specifically requires the respondent to execute a 
contract for "all or such part of parts of the property as 
the parties may agree", leaving the selection of land to 
future agreement. In Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 
517 P.2d 1026 (1973), this Court has already held such con-
tracts uneforceable and, when the future agreement dealt with 
the selection of land, parol evidence may not aid the defi-
cient description. Id. That the Option Agreement both 
necessitated and contemplated future negotiations is evinced 
by respondent's letter of March 30, 1971. That letter, both 
precatory in nature and wholly preparatory to the option's 
exercise, reveals that respondent knew and understood that any 
parcel to be selected had to be agreed upon. 
The Option Agreement· respondent relies on is not an 
integrated document. On page 2 of the Agreement, it recites 
that descriptions referenced therein, specifically the lands 
to be purchased and excluded from the purchase, will be 
attached thereto and independently su~scribed by the parties 
as "Schedule A". No such schedule exists. Thus, these 
descriptions which were to be an integral part of the Option 
Agreement and which were of such importance to the parties as 
to require mutual approval, and subsequent and independent sub-
scription, are lacking. 
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There are, however, various land descriptions 
before the Court. Two exist in the Earnest Money Receipt 
and Option Agreement, both of which referred to man made 
structures and require futher delineation. A third descrip-
tion exists on an annexation plat prepared at respondent's 
request, and ultimately, a fourth exists as an exhibit to 
respondent's real estate purchase contract presented to the 
lower court for the appellant's signature. Respondent suc-
cessfully asserted in the lower court that the descriptions 
in the Earnest ::-1oney Receipt and Option Agreement were the 
same and, further, that they were identical to that 
description on the real estate purchase contract. An exami-
nation of the record will reveal that this is not true, as 
those descriptions, particularly with reference to Section 22 
of Township 42 South, Range 15 West, Salt Lake base and 
meridian, play havoc with each other. Further, in his letter 
of March 30, 1971, respondent specifically indicated that 
he was only annexing "that land which I am [he was] buying 
from you [appellant]." The option expired on June 14, 1971. 
A year later, respondent submitted his real estate purchase 
contract which covers approximately seventy (70) acres less 
ground than the annexation. Yet, in one breath, the lower 
court held that the letter along with a tender of $2,000.00 
properly exercised the option and directed that appellant sign 
a real estate purchase contract submitted by respondent. It 
should be clear to this Court that a letter is not a proper 
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exercise when the option specifically requires that a con-
tract be executed. Further, even assuming the letter were 
a proper exercise, the decree below does not conform to 
the terms proposed by the letter. The respondent attached a 
linen to the letter which, as subsequently ratified by the 
City of St. George, appears in the file as the Holidare Lands 
Addition to St. George City: According to the respondent's 
alleged letter of exercise, he was buying that land and under 
oath, respondent confirmed that "he was buying approximately 
450 acres described in the Holidaire Lands annexation plat 
and option agreement dated September 21, 1964." The respon-
dent's real estate purchase contract, however, which the 
lower court has directed the appellant to sign and which was 
attached to respondent's motion for summary judgment and 
memorandum of authorities, describes a different parcel of 
land'. 
The respondent, who seeks specific enforcement of the 
Option Agreement, bears the burden of showing that he has 
strictly complied with its terms. Paragraph 5 of the Option 
Agreement specifically required that the option be exercised 
by the preparation and submission of a real estate contract 
on lands to be agreed upon. The last extension payment made 
to keep the option open was tendered on or before December 14, 
1970 and, by its own terms, the option expired on June 14, 1971. 
On this date, no contract had been submitted to the appellant 
for her approval. Respondent's failure to submit a purchase 
contract until almost a year after the option expired is 
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is untimely and fatally defective. 
In the lower court, respondent successfully advanced 
the proposition that his letter of March 30, 1971, coupled 
with his tender of $2,000.00 in June of 1971 exercised the 
option. Beyond blatantly ignoring the requirements of the 
Option Agreement, this proposition ignores the tenor of the 
letter which is to resolve certain matters preparatory to 
the exercise of the option. 
[T]here are one or two matters that should be 
considered preparatory to my exercising the option 
and the delivery of title to a portion of the 
land designated by the option. 
Analytically, the letter is precatory and cannot bear the 
burden of the option's exercise. Further, respondent does 
not now seek to purchase that land described in the linen 
which was attached to the ltter, but a smaller parcel. 
The only tender of a real estate purchase contract 
occurred in May of 1972, eleven months after the option had 
expired, and after respondent had been advised of its expira-
tion. That tender (assuming, arguendo, that it was proper in 
every other regard) was untimely. Respondent contends on 
the basis of parol evidence that timeliness, which is material 
i.n Utah, is excused; this, even though the Option Agreement had! 
been in effect more than nine years when it expired and despite 
respondent's stipulation that at no time did appellant request 
him to refrain from submitting a contract as required under 
the Option Agreement. 
In proposing that appellant share in the cost of a 
survey and accept a proposed exercise to a parcel only approxi-
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mating the land described in the Option Agreement, the letter 
which the lower court held exercised the option was precatory 
and amounted to little more than a counteroffer. The letter 
is also an unintegrated document as it specifically mentions 
three enclosures, only one of which is in the record. The 
appellant cannot even recall the other two enclosures, and, 
it begs the question, she certainly does not know of their 
location. Another defect in the letter as it appears in the 
record is its lack of a signature. 
An option is a continuing offer which invites unilat-
eral acceptance. Acceptance converts the option into a 
mutually binding contract, and the optionee, as well as the 
optionor, can be compelled to perform. The letter that the 
lower court found exercised the option is precatory, vague, 
ambivalent and contradictory, Unintegrated and unsigned 
in the record before the Court, it is impossible to conceive 
that appellant could maintain an action against the respondent 
on the basis of that letter. Indeed, more than a year after 
the letter had been drafted, respondent through one of his 
attorneys indicated that the land descriptions were still a 
minor problem and had to be resolved. This Court also cannot 
ignore the fact that the contract description presented to 
the lower court varies from the annexation linen referred to 
in the letter. 
Ultimately, the lower court held that a real estate 
purchase contract presented to Appellant in May of 1972 and 
attached to respondent's motion for surmnary judgment and 
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me~orandum of authorities was in conformity with the Option 
Agreement and should be signed by Appellant. Nothing could 
be less true. First, the land description in the real estate 
purchase contract excludes land in the SE 1/4 NE 1/4 of Section 
22 and is not in conformity either to the Option Agreement, 
or the annexation linen which accompanied the March 30, 1971 
letter of "exercise". Secondly, the real estate purchase 
contract ignores the Option Agreement's clear requirement 
for the mutual agreement of the parties on many terms, the most 
important of which was the amount of land subject to any con-
tract of sale exercising the option. Thirdly, the real 
estate purchase contract was not only untimely submitted, but 
the payment schedule recited therein also fails to conform 
with the Option Agreement. Fourth, the real estate purchase 
contract recites in its preamble that the Option Agreement 
was exercised by the letter and check of March and June of 
1971 respectively. This ignores the clear specification 
in the Option Agreement that the option be exercised by the 
execution of a contract to purchase lands to be mutually 
agreed upon. Lastly, even assuming the real estate purchase 
contract properly described a parcel agreed upon and even 
assuming timely tender, the consideration recited therein is, 
according to respondent's own sworn admissions, insufficient 
to make the purported purchase. 
For the foregoing reasons, we strongly feel a 
reversal of the decision of the District Court is mandated. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
ALLEN, THOMPSON, HUGHES & BERLE 
~{)~ 
Michael D. Hughes 
Royal K. Hunt 
Theodore I. Wittmayer 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
Served two copies of the foregoing Brief on James P. Crowley 
of Watkins and Campbell, 310 South Main Street, Salt1 Lake 
City, Utah, by delivering them to him on this )'7 ':V' 
day of July, 1977. 
Royal 
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